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We calculate composite indexes to compare the attractiveness of 25 European countries for 
institutional investments into the Venture Capital and Private Equity asset class. To achieve this 
we use 42 different criteria, and propose an aggregation structure that allows for benchmarking 
on more granulated levels. The United Kingdom leads our ranking, followed by Ireland, Denmark, 
Sweden, and Norway. While Germany is slightly above the average European attractiveness level, 
the scores are rather disappointing, for example, for France, Italy, Spain, and Greece. Our analyses 
reveal that while the United Kingdom is similar to the other European countries with respect to 
many criteria, there are two major differences which ultimately affect its attractiveness: its 
investor protection & corporate governance rules, and the size and liquidity of its capital market. 
The state of the capital market is likewise a proxy for the professionalism of the financial 
community, for deal flow and exit opportunities. We determine a reasonable correlation between 
our attractiveness index scores and actual Venture Capital and Private Equity fundraising 
activities and prove the robustness of our calculations. Our findings across all the European 
countries suggest that, while investor protection and capital markets are in fact very important 
determinants for attractiveness, there are numerous other criteria to consider. 
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THE EUROPEAN VENTURE CAPITAL AND PRIVATE 





Why is there such a strong market for Venture Capital (VC) and Private Equity (PE) in the 
United Kingdom or in the United States, why is there relatively little activity in Germany, for 
example, the largest European economy, and why is activity close to zero in Greece or in some 
of the new European Union accession countries? Spatial variations in VC/PE activity result 
from numerous factors. Partly, they can be explained by built-in bias mechanisms. The whole 
investment process from institutional investors (the Limited Partners or LPs) to the finally-
backed corporations is geographically biased: the largest, most prominent and most active 
institutional investors in the VC/PE asset class are located in the United States. This certainly 
contributes to the dominant role of the United States Venture Capital and Private Equity 
market. However, not only in the US, the institutional investors allocate their capital via chains 
of agents and networks in certain regions, and among countries. Usually, there is a 
concentration in ‘hotspots’ or core economic centers. These hotspots evolve mainly for two 
reasons. First, there is a professional community to support transactions, and to establish the 
capital supply side. Second, there must be expectation for demand of the committed capital. 
The last elements along the chain of agents are the Venture Capital and Private Equity funds 
(the General Partners or GPs). They prefer spatial proximity in their investments to facilitate the 
transaction processes, monitoring and involvement. It is popular for GPs to focus on a 
particular region, or just on one single country when searching for corporations that deserve 
financial backing. Hence, the geographical source of VC/PE is generally not very distant from 
the demand. This built-in bias mechanism is intensified by the institutional investors’ 
international allocation approaches. Diversification needs urge the LPs to commit capital to 
funds that cover a particular country, or region. Therefore, LPs make a geographical selection of 
promising spots. The selection depends on their expectation of the demand for VC/PE, and on 
their evaluation of the host country’s professional community. 
In this paper, we address the international VC/PE allocation issue and propose a composite 
measure to compare the attractiveness of 25 European countries (the EU-25 with Estonia, Latvia 
and Lithuania grouped as “The Baltic States”, plus Switzerland and Norway). We review the 
literature and search for criteria that determine both supply and demand for VC and PE in a 
country. The higher the quality of the criteria, the more attractive a particular country is for 
institutional investors. We find 42 data series for our sample countries as proxies for these  
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criteria and aggregate them to the “Venture Capital and Private Equity Country Attractiveness 
Index”. In this first step, we combine all the criteria into one index and receive an 
attractiveness ranking of the European countries. The index structure allows for benchmarking, 
and we comment our results for the first ranked, for the largest European and for the last 
ranked countries; namely United Kingdom, Germany, and Romania. Our analyses reveal that, 
while the European countries are similar with respect to many criteria, there are two major 
differences which ultimately affect a country’s attractiveness: the protection of investors & 
corporate governance, and the size and liquidity of its capital market, which is likewise a proxy 
for the professionalism of the financial community, for deal flow and exit opportunities. In 
sensitivity analyses, we show that our index is robust with respect to different aggregation 
methods. In a second approach, we control for the fact that some of the criteria are more 
meaningful for either of the two market segments Venture Capital and Private Equity. Venture 
Capital is used to back young and start-up corporations in markets with high growth 
expectations. Private Equity finances changes of ownership in established businesses, often 
supported by debt finance. Hence, we calculate two more indexes, one of them focused on VC, 
and one on PE only. Finally, as a further robustness check, we analyze whether our initially 
chosen series of 42 data does not over-determine the index and present a calculation where we 
discard criteria. This tight index version consists of 17 determinants only, and aims to improve 
the results in a statistical sense. With the initially proposed index structure, its sensitivity 
analyses, and the three alternative index definitions, we show that there are five tier groups of 
attractiveness of European countries for VC and PE investments. The attractiveness ranking is 
robust to different aggregation methods, and to the deletion of individual data series. Some 
countries would change ranks within their tier group, especially when we focus on the 
individual VC and PE indexes; however, there is hardly any transition across the tier groups. 
We compare the indexes from the sensitivity analyses and the tight index version with the 
actual VC and PE fundraising activities in the particular countries and reveal reasonable 
correlations of both figures. We achieve the highest correlation for the initially proposed “base-
case” index structure consisting of 42 data series. This signals that, while investor protection 
and corporate governance, and the capital markets are in fact very important determinants to 
assess the attractiveness of a country for VC and PE investors, there are many more criteria to 
consider. Neglecting some of them, leads to inferior tracking results. 
Our paper makes the following contributions: First, we provide a comprehensive discussion of 
the important parameters that determine the international allocation process of institutional 
investors in the VC and PE asset class. Second, we propose a composite measure, data sources, 
and the methodology to quantify how individual economies attract these investors. Third, we 
apply the suggested method, perform sensitivity analyses and robustness checks and create a 
ranking for 25 European countries. Fourth, with these analyses, we are able to benchmark the 
individual countries with respect to detailed strengths and weaknesses, and explicitly do so for 
the United Kingdom, Germany and Romania. Fifth, we show that all of the included criteria are 
important, and neglecting some of them reduces the tracking power of the index. Sixth, while 
there are many similarities among the European countries, we claim that the size and liquidity 
of their capital markets, and hence the professional environment, deal flow, and exit 
opportunities finally distinguish their attractiveness. 
The paper is structured as follows: After a brief introduction of our assumptions about supply 
and demand in the VC/PE market, we review the most important literature on the criteria for 
vivid VC and PE markets, and discuss the relevant parameters for our index. Next, we explain 
the data and the technical background for our calculations. We verify the appropriateness of 
the sub-indicators included, and discuss different aggregation methods. Then we present the  
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index’s results, interpret them, perform the sensitivity analyses and robustness checks, and 
determine tier groups regarding the attractiveness of the various economies for VC/PE 
investors. Finally, we measure the tracking power of our index, summarize this paper, and 
conclude. 
2. Equilibrium in the VC/PE Market 
Gompers and Lerner (1998), Balboa and Martí (2003), and Jeng and Wells (2000) 
comprehensively discuss models and conditions for achieving equilibrium in a national VC/PE 
market. Institutional investors supplying VC/PE analyze several economic parameters and 
estimate the future demand for particular countries. Then, they choose among them for their 
international asset allocation. Statistics on supply and demand characteristics for VC/PE in 
Europe, such as EVCA (2007), show that there is usually no lack of supply of funds. On the 
contrary, the amount of funds raised in a particular year is generally higher than the amount 
invested in the same period, and the funds raised will be invested progressively in subsequent 
years. The suppliers of capital estimate the demand for VC/PE over a horizon of several years 
and make their allocations accordingly. Consequently, they judge the individual countries’ 
attractiveness. This attractiveness is primarily determined by expectations about the ability of 
local VC/PE funds to perform a sufficient number of transactions with satisfactory risk and 
return ratios. Hence, the predominant issues regarding the attractiveness of a particular region 
for an institutional investor are the availability of adequate investment opportunities and the 
infrastructure to perform the transactions. The investment opportunities are directly related to 
local entrepreneurial activities and associated, among other factors, with innovations, 
restructurings, the pure size of the economy, growth expectations, and the entrepreneurial spirit 
of people. The quality of the infrastructure to handle deal flow and exit is related to the 
professionalism of the financial community. However, it is not clear to what extent these 
factors influence the attractiveness of individual economies for investors in VC/PE funds, and 
how much these factors depend on others respectively. Therefore, in the following section, we 
provide a comprehensive overview of the literature dealing with success factors for 
entrepreneurial activities, and the volume of VC/PE transactions. 
3. Literature Review 
The related literature discusses and analyses the determinants of Venture Capital and Private 
Equity activity in national economies or regions. However, only some of the papers explicitly 
distinguish between the Venture Capital and Private Equity market segments. One can intuit 
whether the reported finding is more relevant for backing corporations in early stages or later 
stages of their lifetime. Some criteria have a stronger impact on young and start-up 
corporations, some of them more closely affect established businesses, while others are valid for 
all corporations and, hence, both market segments. In our literature overview, we do not 
differentiate at the first stage between the two segments, but rather present all the relevant 
findings that should influence the institutional investors’ allocation decisions. In a subsequent 
section of this paper, we separately focus on the more relevant topic for either the Venture 
Capital or the Private Equity segment, and briefly discuss the more important activity 
determinants in each market.  
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We group the literature overview into six sub-chapters that will also reflect the structure of our 
index, as we subsequently explain. Each heading represents one of six “key drivers” that we 
regard important, appropriate and quantifiable to determine the attractiveness of a country for 
institutional VC/PE investments. The sub-chapters define a set of criteria we need to proxy with 
our index. 
3.1. Literature on the Importance of Economic Activity 
Intuitively, the state of a particular country’s economy should affect the VC/PE activity. Pure 
economic size will be an indicator for the body of corporations and deal flow opportunities in 
general. Economic growth should also lead to demand for finance. Gompers and Lerner (1998) 
focus on the VC segment and point out that there exist more attractive opportunities for 
entrepreneurs if the economy is growing quickly. Wilken (1979) argues that a situation of 
economic prosperity and development facilitates entrepreneurship as it provides a greater 
accumulation of capital for investments. The ease of start-ups is expected to be related to 
societal wealth, not only due to the availability of start-up financing, but also to higher income 
among potential customers in the domestic market. Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la 
Potterie (2004) find that VC/PE activity is cyclical and significantly related to GDP growth. 
3.2. Literature on the Importance of the Capital Market 
Black and Gilson (1998) focus on the differences between bank-centered and stock market-
centered capital markets. They argue that a well-developed stock market that permits Venture 
Capitalists to exit through an IPO is crucial for the existence of a vibrant VC market. In general, 
bank-centered capital markets show less ability to produce an efficient VC infrastructure. They 
affirm that it is not merely the strong stock market missing in bank-centered capital markets; it 
is also the secondary institutions, including the bankers’ conservative approach to lending and 
investing and the social and financial incentives that reward entrepreneurs less richly and 
penalize failure more severely, that compromise entrepreneurial activity. While their paper 
focuses on the early stage segment, the findings should be equally important for the later stage. 
Jeng and Wells (2000) stress that the main force behind the cyclical swings is IPO activity 
because it reflects the potential return to the VC/PE funds. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) confirm 
this. Analogue to Black and Gilson (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2000) point out that risk 
capital flourishes in countries with deep and liquid stock markets. Likewise, Schertler (2003) 
uses either the capitalization of stock markets or the number of listed companies as a measure 
for the liquidity of stock markets. He finds that the liquidity of stock markets has a significant 
positive impact on VC investments at early stages. 
Despite the principal disadvantages of bank-centered capital markets, Green (1998) emphasizes 
that low availability of debt financing is an obstacle for start-ups in many countries. 
Entrepreneurs need to find backers - whether banks or VC/PE funds - who are willing to bear 
risk. Hellmann et al. (2004) argue that banks represent the dominant financial institutions in 
most of the countries. They examine the role of banks for the VC/PE industry and stress that 
banks act in this market segment mainly for strategic reasons. They try to build early 
relationships for future lending activities. Cetorelli and Gamera (2001) provide evidence that 
bank concentration promotes the growth of those industrial sectors that have a higher need for 
external finance by facilitating credit access to younger companies. 
Additionally, the VC/PE activity in a particular country relates to the state of the local VC/PE 
market’s maturity level. Sapienza et al. (1996) mention that acceptance in a country’s society  
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and the historical evolvement of its VC/PE market determines investor confidence. Balboa and 
Martí (2003) find that annual fundraising volume is strongly dependent on the previous year’s 
market liquidity. Chemla (2005) argues that the management of VC/PE funds is costly. 
Particular regions become attractive to investors only when the expected number of 
transactions is large and their volumes and payoffs exceed a certain amount to cover the 
management fees. Hence, the entry of new investors is dependent upon the prevailing activity 
in that region. 
3.3. Literature on the Importance of Taxes 
We assume that two types of taxes affect VC and PE activity; those directly related to the asset 
class, such as taxes on dividends and capital gains, and those with an impact on corporations 
and entrepreneurship, such as corporate tax rates. Gompers and Lerner (1998) stress that the 
capital gains tax rate influences VC/PE activity. In fact, they confirm Poterba’s finding (1989), 
who builds a decision-model to become entrepreneur. Bruce (2000 and 2002), and Cullen and 
Gordon (2002) prove that taxes matter for businesses entry and exit. Djankov et al. (2008) show 
that corporate tax rates strongly affect entrepreneurship. Bruce and Gurley (2005) explain that 
increases in income tax raise the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Hence, the 
difference between personal income tax rates and corporate tax rates tends to be an incentive 
to create self-employment. 
3.4. Literature on the Importance of Investor Protection and Corporate Governance 
Legal structures and the protection of property rights also appear to influence the attractiveness 
of a VC/PE market. La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) confirm that the legal environment strongly 
determines the size and extent of a country’s capital market and local companies’ ability to 
receive outside financing. They emphasize the difference between law on books and the quality 
of law enforcement in some countries. Roe (2006) comprehensively discusses and compares 
political determinants of corporate governance rules for the major economies and focuses on 
the importance of a strong minority shareholder protection to develop a vibrant capital market. 
Glaeser et al. (2001), and Djankov et al. (2003 and 2005) suggest that parties in common-law 
countries have greater ease in enforcing their rights from commercial contracts. Cumming et al. 
(2006a) find that the quality of a country’s legal system is stronger connected to facilitating 
VC/PE backed exits than the size of a country’s stock market. Cumming et al. (2006b) extend 
this finding and show that cross-country differences in legality, including legal origin and 
accounting standards, have a significant impact on the governance of investments in the VC/PE 
industry. Desai et al. (2006) discuss that fairness and property rights protection largely 
determine the growth and emergence of new enterprises. Cumming and Johan (2007) highlight 
that the perceived importance of regulatory harmonization increases institutional investors’ 
allocations to the asset class. La Porta et al. (2002) find lower cost of capital for companies in 
countries with better investor protection. Lerner and Schoar (2005) confirm these findings. 
Johnson et al. (1999) show that weak property rights limit the reinvestment of profits in start-
up companies. Even so, Knack and Keefer (1995), Mauro (1995), and Svensson (1998) 
demonstrate that property rights significantly affect investments and economic growth.  
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3.5. Literature on the Importance of the Human and Social Environment 
Black and Gilson (1998), Lee and Peterson (2000), and Baughn and Neupert (2003) argue that 
national cultures shape both individual orientation and environmental conditions, which lead 
to different levels of entrepreneurial activity in particular countries. Megginson (2004) argues 
that, in order to foster a growing risk capital industry, research culture plays an important role, 
especially in universities or national laboratories. 
Rigid labor market policies negatively affect the evolvement of a VC/PE market. Lazear (1990), 
and Blanchard (1997) discuss how protection of workers can reduce employment and growth. 
Black and Gilson (1998) argue that labor market restrictions influence VC/PE activity; however, 
not to the same extent as the stock market. 
Djankov et al. (2002) investigate the role of several societal burdens for start-ups in different 
countries. They conclude that the highest barriers and costs are associated with corruption, 
crime, a larger unofficial economy, and bureaucratic delay. 
3.6. Literature on the Importance of Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
Access to viable investments is probably one of the most important factors for the 
attractiveness of a regional VC/PE market. The number of potential investments relates to the 
research output in an economy. Gompers and Lerner (1998) show that both industrial and 
academic R&D expenditure significantly correlates with VC/PE activity. Kortum and Lerner 
(2000) highlight that the growth in VC/PE fundraising in the mid-90s may be due to a surge of 
patents in the late 1980s and 1990s. Schertler (2003) emphasizes that the number of employees 
in the field of R&D, and the number of patents, as an approximation of the human capital 
endowment, has a positive and highly significant influence on VC/PE activity. Furthermore, 
Romain and von Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004) find that the level of entrepreneurship 
interacts with the R&D capital stock, with technological opportunities, and the number of 
patents. Similarly to Djankov et al. (2002), Baughn and Neupert (2003) argue that bureaucracy 
in form of excessive rules and procedural requirements, multiple institutions from which 
approvals are needed, and numerous documentation requirements may severely constrain 
entrepreneurial activity. Lee and Peterson (2000) stress that the time and money required to 
meet such administrative burdens may discourage new venture creations. 
3.7. Summary of the Literature Review 
The numerous contributions emphasize the difficulty of identifying the appropriate criteria for our 
index. There is neither consensus about the most important criterion nor any ranking. While some 
of the criteria are more comprehensively discussed, and certainly of very high relevance, it 
remains unclear how these criteria interact. For example, it is questionable whether the VC/PE 
activity in a country with a high corporate governance level is more affected by the liquidity of 
the national stock market or by the labor regulations. While an IPO exit is in principle possible at 
many stock exchanges in the world, labor market frictions can hardly be evaded. 
For the index calculation, it would be ideal to include all the mentioned criteria. However, some 
of the cited papers focus on particular economies or regions, depending on the data available, 
and their analyzed datasets are not existing or hardly comparable to the datasets that exist for 
the European Union countries (and Norway and Switzerland). Hence, we try to find the best 
possible proxies for the determined drivers of VC/PE activity. Therefore, we summarize the  
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related literature, as already expressed by the sub-chapter’s headings, and identify six main 
criteria that ultimately determine the attractiveness of an individual country for VC/PE 
investments: Economic Activity, Capital Markets, Taxation, Investor Protection & Corporate 
Governance, Human & Social Environment, and Entrepreneurial Opportunities. We regard these 
criteria as “key drivers”, and base the index structure upon them. Since none of the key drivers 
is directly measurable, we regard them as constructs and search for data series that adequately 
express their character. For example, we search appropriate data to proxy Economic Activity. 
Altogether, we find 42 individual data series to describe the six key drivers. We define sub-
constructs and group data series when they share a common character. We refer to the sub-
constructs as lower index levels (level 2 and 3) and aggregate the data on the lower levels to 
concentrate information. The final step is to aggregate the information of the six key drivers to 
the overall index. An important issue is the determination of the weights of the individual data 
series and constructs when aggregating the index. We describe the structure of our constructs, 
the methodologies for determining the weights and for the index aggregation in the following 
chapter. 
4. Data and Aggregation Methodology 
4.1. Data Sample 
The selection of our data series is driven by the previous literature findings. The task is to find 
adequate measures that share common characteristics with one of the six identified key drivers 
for the European Union countries plus Switzerlan d and Norway. T hus, we  want to rely on  
commonly accepted data sets only and, below, we propose the 42 individual data series 
presented. However, the selection remains arguable: we might include additional data-series, or 
exchange some of them against different ones. The quality of some data might be poor due to 
heterogeneous data gathering methods in the individual countries. Additionally, we might 
include too many individual items for the calculation and, hence, over-determine the index. A 
fewer items might be more appropriate to predict a country’s VC/PE attractiveness. 
To control for this criticism, we perform the robustness checks where we alter the aggregation 
methodology and where we discard data series from the selection. These checks confirm the 
robustness of our calculations, and the data selection. They also emphasize that exchanges of 
particular data-series or discarding data does not meaningfully affect the overall results. We 
present the robustness checks in a subsequent chapter of this paper. 
Table 1 shows the selected raw data series and their sources (respectively, alternative sources if 
data was not available for all countries) that we use for the calculation of our index. The outline 
in Table 1 also represents the structure of the index. The six first-order constructs - Economic 
Activity, Capital Market, Taxation, Investor Protection & Corporate Governance, Human & Social 
Environment, and Entrepreneurial Opportunities - correspond to the six key drivers we already 
defined. The criteria of all lower orders are grouped and aggregated to the next superior construct 
to finally proxy the six latent drivers. For example, 5.2 Labor Regulations, which is one construct 
to express 5. Human & Social Environment, depends on three sub-criteria; 5.2.1 Rigidity of 
Employment, 5.2.2 Hiring Cost, and 5.2.3 Firing Cost. Similarly, 5.2.1 Rigidity of Employment is 
itself constructed by three sub-criteria: 5.2.1.1 Difficulty of Hiring Index, 5.2.1.2 Rigidity of Hours 
Index, and 5.2.1.3 Difficulty of Firing Index.  
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Table 1 
List of raw data and their sources 
Key Drivers/Individual Data Series  Source 
1. Economic Activity   
1.1. Gross Domestic Product   
1.1.1. Total GDP [€/capita]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
1.1.2. Total GDP y-o-y Growth [%]**  Global Market Inform. Database 
1.2. General Price Level [Index=1995]***  Global Market Inform. Database 
1.3. Working Force (Unemployment Rate) [%]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
1.4. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows [% of GDP]***  Global Market Inform. Database 
2. Capital Market   
2.1. IPO [IPO Volume in % of GDP]****  Thomson Financial Data 
2.2. Stock Market   
2.2.1. Stock Market Capitalization [% of GDP]*  Worldbank Data 
2.2.2. Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP [% of GDP]*  Worldbank Data 
2.3. M&A Market [sales % of GDP]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
2.4. Debt & Credit Market   
2.4.1. Central Bank Discount Rate [%]*  IMF 
2.4.2. Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions [% of GDP]*  Worldbank Data 
2.4.3. Number of Banks [per Capita]  EBRD, EUROSTAT Database 
2.5. VC/PE Activity [Funds Invested in % of GDP]****  Thomson Financial Data 
3. Taxation    
3.1. Highest Marginal Corporate Tax Rate (%)  Worldbank Data 
3.2. Difference Between Income and Corporate Tax Rate [%]  The Heritage Foundation 
4. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance   
4.1. Extent of Disclosure Index  Worldbank Data 
4.2. Extent of Director Liability Index  Worldbank Data 
4.3. Ease of Shareholder Suits Index  Worldbank Data 
5. Human & Social Environment   
5.1. Education   
5.1.1. Government Expenditure on Education [% of GDP]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
5.1.2. Amount Employees as Researchers in the University Sector [per capita]  EUROSTAT 
5.1.3. Amount University Students [per capita]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
5.1.4. Amount University Establishments [per capita]  Global Market Inform. Database 
5.2. Labor Regulations   
5.2.1. Rigidity of Employment   
5.2.1.1. Difficulty of Hiring Index  Worldbank Data 
5.2.1.2. Rigidity of Hours Index  Worldbank Data 
5.2.1.3. Difficulty of Firing Index  Worldbank Data 
5.2.2. Hiring Cost [% of salary]  Worldbank Data 
5.2.3. Firing Costs [weeks of wages]  Worldbank Data 
5.3. Bribing & Corruption Index  Transparency 
5.4. Crime   
5.4.1. Juvenile Offenders [per capita]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
5.4.2. Offences [per 100,000 habitants]*  Global Market Inform. Database 
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities   
6.1. General Innovativeness Index  TrendChart.Cordis 
6.2. R&D Expenditure   
6.2.1. Public R&D Expenditures [% of GDP]  EUROSTAT, OECD 
6.2.2. Business R&D Expenditures [% of GDP]  EUROSTAT, OECD 
6.3. Enterprise Restructuring   
6.3.1. Small-Scale Privatization Index  EBRD 
6.3.2. Large-Scale Privatization Index  EBRD 
6.3.3. Governance and Enterprise Restructuring Index  EBRD 
6.4. Enterprise Stock Activity   
6.4.1. Number of Enterprises [per capita]  World Bank, EUROSTAT, OECD 
6.4.2. Enterprise Foundation Rate [%]*  World Bank, EUROSTAT, OECD 
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business   
6.5.1. Procedures [numbers]  Worldbank Data 
6.5.2. Time [days]  Worldbank Data 
6.5.3. Cost of Business Start-Up Procedures [% GNI per capita]  Worldbank Data 
6.5.4. Min. Capital [% GNI per capita]   Worldbank Data 
 
*  =  arithmetic average of annual data from 2000 to 2005, 
**  =  geometric average of annual data from 2000 to 2005, 
***  =  log of arithmetic average of annual data from 2000 to 2005, 
****  =  arithmetic average of annual data since coverage in the database for CEE countries, arithmetic average of 
annual data from 2003 to 2005 for the other countries, otherwise: 2005 data record. 
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We use time series ranging from 2000 to 2005 and usually refer to the last data record. 
However, some of the data-points are averages over a certain time-period to smooth 
fluctuations. For example, GDP figures, VC and PE activity or M&A transaction volume among 
others are such averages considering the period from 2000 to 2005. For large fluctuations and 
large differences between the countries we also use logs of the averages (please refer to the 
legend of Table 1 for detailed information). In less than one percent of all cases, data was not 
available for a certain year. If data-points are missing, we apply the three methods suggested 
by Nardo et al. (2005a) in the following order: a) We try to find missing data in other databases 
or via the Internet, b) we interpolate between the adjacent data records, and c) we use the latest 
available data before 2005. 
However, we do not always use raw data but sometimes refer to ready-made indexes like the 
“doing business indexes” from the World Bank.
1 For instance, our indicator for investor 
protection and corporate governance is a ready-made index. For detailed descriptions of the 
individual index items, we refer the reader to the Appendix to this paper and the original 
data sources, where comprehensive definitions and descriptions of the data series are 
provided. Also in the Appendix, we comment on our motivation for the choice of the data 
series in more detail. We discuss the problems that remain in the selection, and how we 
address these issues. 
4.2. Base Case Index Calculation 
In general, composite indicators are used to summarize a number of underlying individual 
indicators or variables. They are quantitative or qualitative measures derived from a series of 
observed facts that can reveal or proxy characteristics. The facts we observe for our index are 
heterogeneous and, to ensure that our cross-country aggregations are comparable, we need to 
deflate several variables by the sizes of the economies/countries and use either GDP or 
population as deflators. Further, due to the large number of index items (42) and data-points 
(105) per country (including the data records over a certain period to calculate the averages), 
we follow the method as already described above, and proposed by Nicoletti et al. (2000). We 
determine a structure of three sub-index levels and group the items that we expect to correlate 
with each other. The main advantage of this structure is that we can trace back indicator values 
to increasing levels of detail. This will help in interpreting the strengths and weaknesses of the 
individual countries and in drawing up the conclusions. Another advantage of the built sub-
constructs is, in fact, that lower data series do not gain too much weight in the aggregation 
process. For example, the four data series to proxy the burden of starting a business are 
considered only once, when we determine entrepreneurial opportunities. 
Using this composition technique for all the calculations in principle, we differentiate three 
methods to determine the weights for the overall index aggregation. The first method is the 
simplest, where we equally weigh the individual data series or constructs when we aggregate 
them on the superior index level. In the second approach, we refer to it as our base case, we 
perform factor analysis when it is suitable. The third method is a severe application of factor 
analysis, where we discard data series or constructs if discarding them leads to improved 
statistical results. Using this method in the robustness check to calculate the tight index 
version, we break with the above proposed data structure and strictly adhere to the 
mathematical result. For the two latter methods based on factor analyses, we have to prove that 
                                              
1 See http://www.doingbusiness.org.  
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the raw data and the ready-made indexes are consistent for their aggregation. We perform 
reliability analyses, using Cronbach’s Alpha, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling 
Adequacy, and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity to ascertain the consistency of the chosen data and 
the validity of the applied statistical method. 
All the different weighting schemes are sensitive to the normalization and standardization of the 
underlying variables. Hence, we perform sensitivity analyses to show the impact of the different 
approaches on the results. All these procedures are described in the subsequent sections. 
4.2.1. Analysis of Index Consistency 
Cronbach’s (1951) Alpha is a measure of internal consistency of items in a model or survey.
2 It 
assesses how well a set of items measures unidimensionality. Here, we use it to approve the 
consistency in our aggregation steps. Cronbach’s Alpha is defined as: 
 
  (1) 
where n is the number of the components of a (sub-) construct and R  is the mean correlation 
of the items (e.g. the mean of the non-diagonal terms of the correlation matrix). The coefficient 
increases with the number of sub-indicators and with the correlation of each tuple. Cronbach’s 
Alpha is equal to zero if no correlation exists and the sub-indicators are independent. The 
coefficient is equal to one if sub-indicators are perfectly correlated. Hence, a high alpha 
indicates that the underlying items proxy well the desired characteristic. Nunnaly (1978) 
suggests a value of 0.7 as an acceptable threshold. The Cronbach Alpha will provide 
information if our selected data is adequate to express the six key drivers, and if it is 
appropriate to aggregate the six key drivers to the overall index. Additionally, we use 
Cronbach’s Alpha for the determination of the optimal data set when we calculate the tight 
index as a robustness check. 
The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA) is based on the partial 
correlations among the input variables. The measure should be above 0.5 for each individual 
variable and likewise for the overall test. In factor analyses, variables with MSA values below 
0.5 should be omitted from the analysis one at a time. With Bartlett's Test of Sphericity, it can 
be shown that the correlation matrix is not an identity matrix. The test value should be below 
the 0.05 significance level. 
Table 2 presents the consistency of the six key drivers measured by their Cronbach’s Alphas, 
their MSA values and Bartlett’s Test significance values. We do not consider Taxation and 
Investor protection in this calculation, because they consist of only two and three underlying 
data series respectively. Hence, we always aggregate these constructs using equal weights of the 
sub-indicators. 
                                              
2 Cf. Raykov (1998), Cortina (1993), Feldt et al. (1987), Green et al. (1977), Hattie (1985), and Miller (1995). 
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Table 2 
Consistency analysis of the underlying items on the level of the six key drivers 
Key Driver  Cronbach’s Alpha  MSA Value  Bartlett’s Test 
1. Economic Activity  0.553  0.549  0.001 
2. Capital Market  0.729  0.603  0.000 
3. Taxation  -  -  - 
4. Investor Protection & Corporate Governance  -  -  - 
5. Human & Social Environment  0.750  0.604  0.000 
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities  0.785  0.624  0.000 
 
Cronbach’s Alpha for economic activity is below the cut-off value of 0.7. This could lead us to 
exchange or to drop some items that proxy economic activity and we will address this issue in 
the robustness check with our tight index definition, where we show that improvements of 
unidimensionality achieved by discarding data series do not necessarily lead to a more accurate 
overall index. Regardless, the aggregation of the six key drivers to the overall VC/PE 
Attractiveness Index yields a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.769, and the MSA value is 0.629, while the 
Bartlett Test of Sphericity is significant at 0.000. Thus, we propose that our selection of index 
items altogether is adequate to calculate a country’s attractiveness for VC/PE investors, and 
proceed using the index structure with 42 data series as described above. 
4.2.2. Normalization and Standardization 
All data-points need to be normalized for their index aggregation. There exist various 
techniques, each one with particular advantages and disadvantages as discussed by 
Freudenberg (2003), Jacobs et al. (2004), and Nardo et al. (2005a). We use two different 
methods – standardization, and rescaling - in our calculations, and analyze their sensitivity on 
the results. 
Standardization (or z-scores) converts the underlying data to a common scale of the normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. Hence, variables with 
extreme values have a greater effect on the indicator. The z-score is defined as: 
 
  (2) 
The rescaling method is used to normalize indicators to an identical range by linear 
transformation. This method is vulnerable for extreme values or outliers that can distort the 
transformation. However, rescaling can widen the range of indicators lying within small 
intervals more than using the z-scores transformation. The rescaling method is defined as: 
 
  (3) 
Ebert and Welsch (2004) discuss that the selection of a suitable normalization method is not 
trivial and requires special attention. The method must consider the properties of the underlying 
data, as well as the objective of the summarized indicator. The z-scores and the rescaling 
approach are the most commonly used because they have desirable characteristics when it 
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Considering our data, where the values of the variables are rather close to each other for some 
criteria, the rescaling method seems most appropriate because it widens the countries’ spread 
and, thus, allows easier interpretations. Accordingly, we use the rescaling method as our base 
case and convert all variables of the particular sub-indexes to a common scale from 1 to 100 
points. Thereby, 100 represents the best score, while 1 is the worst. For every individual 
variable, we define whether high values positively or negatively influence the attractiveness for 
VC/PE investors, and hence, assign 100 points either to the lowest (e.g. in case of hiring costs) 
or to the highest score (e.g. in case of GDP/Capita). In our sensitivity analyses, we investigate 
the difference resulting from using z-scores for standardization. The next step deals with the 
weighting of the individual criteria and constructs, and their aggregation to the VC/PE 
Attractiveness Index. 
4.2.3. Weighting of the Index Items 
If there are no statistical or empirical grounds for choosing a different scheme, we could use 
equal weights to aggregate the index items. This implies an equal contribution of all sub-
indicators to the VC/PE attractiveness, which is arguable. However, from the large body of 
literature it is difficult to draw conclusions about the importance, and hence the weight, of the 
individual criteria. Equal weighting, as discussed by Nardo et al. (2005a), can be the result of 
insufficient knowledge about causal relationships, ignorance about the correct model to apply 
or even stem from the lack of consensus on alternative solutions. There are a number of 
weighting techniques derived from statistical models. Manly (1994) discusses principal 
component analysis. Nardo et al. (2005a) propose factor analysis, and data development 
analysis. Kaufmann et al. (1999 and 2003) use an unobserved component model. Other, similar 
weighting techniques are derived from analytic hierarchy processes, as described in Forman 
(1983), or Saaty (1987), or from conjoint analysis, as in Green and Srinivasan (1978), Hair et al. 
(1998), and McDaniel and Gates (1998). 
We use both; one approach with equal weights among all the sub-index items and one approach 
based on factor analysis. Using this latter technique, we differentiate between the index levels. 
The level 3 sub-indexes are always aggregated using equal weights, but for the level 2 sub-
indexes, and for the key drivers, we follow Berlage and Terweduwe (1988). In this weighting 
method, each component is assigned a weight according to its contribution to the total variance 
in the data. This is an attractive feature, because it ensures that the resulting summary indicators 
account for a large part of the cross-country variance of the underlying items. That makes this 
method independent of prior views on their relative economic importance. This is at once an 
advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that “we let the data speak” and do not need to 
determine weights on our own which would be an arbitrary task. The disadvantage is that one 
might assume that some of the criteria play a dominant role. However, as highlighted in Nicoletti 
et al. (2000), the properties of factor analyses are particularly desirable for cross-country 
comparisons. In our sensitivity analyses, we investigate the impact of different criteria weights on 
the overall result. 
A detailed discussion of factor analyses is carried out in, for instance, Hair et al. (1998). The general 
linear factor model for p observed variables and q factors or latent variables takes the form: 
 
 ( i = 1,…,p) (4) 
 
i q iq i i i e F F F x + + + + = α α α ... 2 2 1 1 
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where xi represent standardized variables, and αi1,…,αiq are factor loadings related to the factors 
Fi,…,Fq, while ei are residuals. We assume that the factors are uncorrelated with each other, and 
with the residuals. Further, they have zero means, and unit variance. Additionally, the residuals 
are uncorrelated with each other. They have zero means, but not necessarily equal variances. 
Now, the most common method used to extract the first m components is principal component 
analysis. The decision of when to stop extracting factors depends on the point when only little 
“random” variability remains. Various stopping rules have been developed as described in 
Dunteman (1989): Kaiser’s Criterion, Scree Plot, variance explained criteria, Joliffe Criterion, 
Comprehensibility, Bootstrapped Eigenvalues and Eigenvectors. Kaiser’s Criterion is one of the 
most widely used stopping rules and recommends dropping all factors with an Eigenvalue 
below one. Due to Kaiser (1958), most of the total variance is determined by components 
beyond the Eigenvalue of one. However, regarding the Eigenvalues in our sample, there is 
another large decrease of explained variance below Kaiser’s mark. As demonstrated in Table 3, 
we obtain three components that represent 83.8% of the total variance of the underlying data. 
Table 3 
Total variance explained by components 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1  2.747  45.776  45.776 
2  1.306  21.766  67.541 
3  0.976  16.268  83.810 
4  0.446  7.431  91.241 
5  0.300  5.005  96.246 
6  0.225  3.754  100.000 
 
The next step deals with the rotation of factors (see Table 4). According to Hair et al. (1998) the 
usual rotation method is the Varimax Rotation. Rotation minimizes and maximizes the factor 
loadings. Ideally, each indicator is loaded exclusively on one of the factors. Kline (1998) points 
out that the rotation changes the factor loadings and, hence, the factors’ interpretation, but 
leaves the analytical solutions ex-ante and ex-post rotation unchanged. 
Table 4 
Rotated Component Matrix 
  Component 
  1  2  3 
Economic Activity  0.849  0.077  0.249 
Capital Market  0.700  -0.457  0.391 
Taxation  0.018  0.924  0.154 
Investor Protection & Corporate Governance  0.089  0.133  0.966 
Human & Social environment  0.796  0.376  -0.088 
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Table 4 presents the component matrix after Varimax Rotation and allows an interesting 
interpretation: Economic Activity, Capital Market, Human & Social Environment and 
Entrepreneurial Opportunities have high loadings on the first factor. Hence, the first factor 
represents the general socio-economic conditions. Taxation and Investor Protection & Corporate 
Governance each have high loadings on one of the remaining two factors. Consequently, we 
can name the two other factors correspondingly. As a result, the index score of a country 
depends on these three main components: the socio-economic environment, the tax regime and 
the corporate governance & property rights protection. 
The last step (see Table 5) of the weighting procedure deals with the construction of the weights 
from the matrix of factor loadings after rotation. The square of a factor loading represents the 
proportion of the variance of the indicator explained by the factors. Now, the three 
intermediate components are aggregated by weighting each composite using its proportion of 
explained variance in the dataset: 0.513 for the first (0.513 = 2.578/(2.578+1.272+1.179)), 0.253 
for the second component and 0.235 for the third one. Finally, we can calculate the overall 
weights as a linear combination of the three components. 
Table 5 
Calculation of the weights 
  Rotated component loadings  Component weights 
  1  2 3 1 2 3 
Overall 
weights 
Economic  Activity  0.849  0.077  0.249  0.280 0.005 0.053 0.157 
Capital  Market  0.700  -0.457  0.391  0.190 0.164 0.130 0.169 
Taxation  0.018  0.924  0.154  0.000 0.671 0.020 0.174 
Investor Protection & Corporate Governance  0.089  0.133  0.966  0.003  0.014  0.791  0.191 
Human & Social Environment  0.796  0.376  -0.088  0.246  0.111  0.007  0.156 
Entrepreneurial  Opportunity  0.851  -0.211  0.004  0.281 0.035 0.000 0.153 
Explained  Variance  2.578  1.272  1.179       
Explained  Variance/Total  Variance  0.513  0.253  0.234       
 
Table 5 presents the weights of the six key drivers. Investor Protection & Corporate Governance 
achieves the highest weight, followed by Taxation and the Capital Market. However, it becomes 
obvious that the difference between the weights of the six key drivers is not very large, 
probably leading to similar results if we applied equal weights to aggregate the sub-indexes. 
We address this issue in the scenario analyses. 
Tables 3, 4, and 5 present the procedure to determine the weights of the already aggregated key 
drivers. To determine the key drivers we had to perform the analogue procedure one-step 
before, using the data and sub-constructs they consist of. We present the results of the factor 
analyses for the key drivers in the Appendix to this paper. 
Nardo et al. (2005b) discuss the advantages and disadvantages of factor analysis. Factor 
analysis can summarize a set of sub-indicators while preserving the maximum possible 
proportion of the total variation in the original set. This is a very desirable feature for cross-
country comparisons. Contrarily, the determined factor loadings might not represent the real 
influence of sub-indicators. However, the real influences are as yet unknown and our index will 
contribute to solving this problem. Furthermore, factor analysis is highly sensitive towards 
modification of the sample due to data revisions or updates of new countries. Factor analysis is  
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also very sensitive to the presence of outliers, which may introduce a spurious variability in the 
data, and to the sample size. 
4.2.4. Aggregation 
Various possible procedures exist for the index aggregation. Nardo et al. (2005a and 2005b) 
distinguish additive methods, geometric aggregation and non-compensatory multi-criteria 
analysis. We focus on linear and geometric aggregation because they are in common use. 
Linear aggregation is an additive method and defined as: 
∑ ∑ = ≤ ≤ =
ii
i i i w and w where x w x 1 , 1 0 ,
 (5) 
Geometric aggregation is defined as: 





i w and w where x x
i 1 , 1 0 ,
 (6) 
Ebert and Welsch (2004) recommend that the linear aggregation method is useful when all sub-
indicators have the same measurement unit, and geometric aggregation is better suited if non-
comparable and strictly positive sub-indicators are expressed in different ratio scales. Nardo et 
al. (2005a) highlight that linear aggregation assigns base indicators proportionally to the 
weights, while geometric aggregation rewards those countries or those sub-indicators with 
higher scores. Overall, a shortcoming in the value of one variable or sub-index can be 
compensated by a surplus in another. Compensability is constant in linear aggregation, while it 
is smaller in geometric aggregation for the sub-indicators with low values. Therefore, countries 
with low scores in some sub-indexes benefit from linear aggregation. 
Linear aggregation is the more intuitive approach. However, the subsequently described 
sensitivity analyses reveal that the index calculation based on geometric aggregation yields the 
best tracking results if we compare the index scores with the actual fundraising activities of the 
particular countries. For this reason, we describe our base case findings using the geometric 
aggregation method in the following chapter. 
5. Results 
5.1. Base Case Findings 
We calculate the base case of our VC/PE Attractiveness Index according to the procedures 
described using rescaling, factor analysis, and geometric aggregation. Figure 1 presents the 
index rankings for the 25 European Union countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania grouped 
into the Baltic States), plus Switzerland and Norway. We also calculate a GDP-weighted average 
score of the EU-25 members. This average score is rescaled to 100 points to simplify country 
comparisons. Hence, every country is directly comparable to the European Union average.  
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Figure 1 





















The top performers are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Sweden and Norway. Germany, 
the largest European economy, ranks slightly above the average, while other large economies, 
such as France, Italy, and Spain have rather disappointing scores. Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, 
and Romania are the least attractive European countries for VC and PE investors. Bulgaria, 
Slovakia, and Romania are “new” European Union members that just recently joined in 2004. 
Caused by the ongoing transition process from former centrally-governed socialistic economies 
their low scores are understandable. However, for Greece the result is unfruitful. Due to lack of 
space, we cannot discuss the decisive factors that determine the scores for all the individual 
countries. However, we find a typical pattern in the scores and explain it with a focus on the 
first and last ranked countries, and on the largest European economy. 
Figure 2 presents a spider chart with the scores of the six key drivers for the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Romania. Once again, the EU-25 average is rescaled to 100 so that the scores are 
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Figure 2 











Figure 2 shows that, while Investor Protection & Corporate Governance is on an equal level for 
Romania and Germany, the United Kingdom is superior. There is only very little dispersion 
regarding Investor Protection & Corporate Governance among the Continental European Union 
members as they all have similar rules. However, the United Kingdom (and this is also valid for 
Ireland) impressively outperforms the EU-25 average. La Porta (1997 and 1998), Glaeser et al. 
(2001), and Djankov et al. (2003 and 2005) link this to the common law system. Roe (2006) 
emphasizes that and argues that the historically good corporate law protection of minority 
shareholders in the United Kingdom is a good example for the precondition for the 
development of a vibrant capital market. This becomes evident when we compare the scores for 
the Capital Market key driver of the three countries. While the size and liquidity of Germany’s 
and Romania’s capital markets are even below the EU-25 average, the United Kingdom 
demonstrates its major advantage. This is in line with the findings of Black and Gilson (1998) 
who discuss the implications of a stock market centered capital market for the VC/PE asset 
class. Similarly, Gompers and Lerner (2000) highlight the importance of the capital market. 
Good investor protection leads to a vibrant capital market, and this likewise establishes the 
required professional community to secure deal flow and exit opportunities for VC and PE 
funds. The capital market turns out to be the most distinguishing feature between the United 
Kingdom and the other European countries. The United Kingdom is on par or only slightly 
better than the EU-25 average with respect to Economic Activity, Entrepreneurial Opportunities, 
and Human and Social Environment. It has a small disadvantage regarding Taxation. However, 
this disadvantage is more than compensated by its Investor Protection & Corporate Governance 
and its Capital Market. Our proposed index structure allows disaggregation of the results on the 
lower index levels. Figure 3 presents the scores for the United Kingdom, Germany and Romania 
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Figure 3 














Figure 3 underlines the strengths of the United Kingdom Capital Market and its Investor 
Protection  & Corporate Governance. It also presents its disadvantage regarding Taxation. 
Germany has lessened the tax burden for its corporations in recent years and, in addition, is 
above average regarding the differential to the top income tax rate. Romania has a very low 
corporate tax rate, but the same low top income tax rate (hence an invisible score of 1 point). 
The United Kingdom is on a par with the average European corporate tax rate but only has a 
small differential to the income tax rate. For Romania, we should note that its top position 
regarding GDP is caused by the large growth rate in recent years and not by the GDP/capita 
figure. This information would become transparent if we presented the scores on the subsequent 
index-sublevels. Additionally, as can be seen in Figure 3, Romania’s scores regarding 
innovations are disappointing. 
5.2. Sensitivity Analyses 
Our index is sensitive to the normalization, weighting, and aggregation techniques. For our 
base case calculation, we use rescaling, factor analysis, and geometric aggregation. Now, we 
address the sensitivity of the index scores regarding the applied normalization, weighting, and 
aggregation. 
Since the alternative procedures are straightforward calculations using the same data and index 
structure, we do not present the individual calculation steps, but only the results in Table 6. The 
Table shows the countries’ scores and ranks according to several combinations of the discussed 
calculation methods. The first two columns present our base case for comparison. Then we use 
equal weights for aggregating the constructs on the next upper levels, instead of weights 
determined by factor analysis. Next, we combine linear aggregation and factor analysis. The 
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third sensitivity analysis applies equal weights, and linear aggregation, while in the last one we 
use z-scores for normalization instead of our rescaling procedure. It is obvious that the 



















Table 6 documents that the discussed statistical issues, and the choice of the weighting 
technique and aggregation procedure do not harm our general ranking to a great extent. The 
results are driven by the socio-economic facts and not by the weighting scheme. However, the 
analyses also provoke the question about the most reliable index version. This question will be 
addresses after further robustness checks. 
5.3. Robustness Checks: Separate VC and PE Indexes, and a Statistically Optimized 
Tight Index Calculation 
As argued above, our proposed data selection is subject to criticism. First, all the criteria 
defined are not equally important for both market segments, Venture Capital and Private 
Equity. Second, it might anyway be suitable to minimize the input data and discard some of the 
selected criteria. We address these issues with three robustness checks: we redefine our index 
structure and the appropriate data series, and calculate two separate VC and PE indexes as well 
as a “tight index”. 
Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking Score Ranking
Austria 97.95 11 95.46 11 99.94 11 100.10 11 101.72 12
Baltic States 85.47 18 79.13 19 92.61 17 89.63 17 89.76 17
Belgium 95.99 12 91.78 12 102.01 10 100.01 12 102.09 10
Bulgaria 51.54 22 46.18 23 79.00 22 74.49 22 76.95 23
Czech Republic 85.87 17 81.68 17 85.01 19 82.39 19 81.39 19
Denmark 129.09 3 129.64 3 120.60 5 121.02 5 122.76 4
Finland 106.55 8 111.07 9 104.22 8 109.16 8 110.52 8
France 91.55 15 90.62 13 94.96 16 94.94 13 96.87 13
Germany 102.68 9 103.60 10 99.49 12 100.62 10 101.77 11
Greece 49.18 23 50.29 22 69.38 25 67.20 25 64.52 25
Hungary 93.26 14 88.85 14 95.87 14 93.29 15 94.10 15
Ireland 130.57 2 132.06 2 130.03 1 127.85 1 129.51 1
Italy 80.24 19 80.05 18 81.22 21 80.99 21 79.27 21
Luxembourg 115.17 6 111.10 8 127.21 2 124.30 3 123.82 3
Netherlands 109.87 7 112.09 7 102.34 9 105.00 9 108.72 9
Norway 123.79 5 121.85 5 110.63 6 110.36 7 112.13 7
Poland 75.03 20 63.90 21 89.23 18 83.00 18 86.54 18
Portugal 93.85 13 88.52 15 95.89 13 92.69 16 92.01 16
Romania 43.05 25 35.90 25 76.69 23 73.34 24 75.58 24
Slovakia 48.37 24 44.72 24 76.27 24 73.81 23 78.76 22
Slovenia 90.79 16 87.46 16 95.34 15 94.14 14 95.06 14
Spain 66.55 21 68.13 20 82.41 20 81.97 20 80.76 20
Sweden 127.70 4 128.85 4 122.26 4 124.96 2 125.13 2
Switzerland 102.30 10 112.65 6 109.83 7 117.90 6 116.20 6
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For the separate VC and PE indexes, we refer to the literature overview and analyze the 
importance of the individual criteria for either market segment. Some of the criteria affect both 
segments equally, others are relatively less important either for Venture Capital or for Private 
Equity. Hence, we discard these criteria from the data selection to calculate the specific index. 
To gain variation in these robustness checks, we apply this rule strictly, even if the differences 
in importance are minor. 
We assume that the general Economic Activity and Investor Protection & Corporate Governance 
affect both segments equally. Therefore, we use the same data and aggregation structure as 
before for both indexes. For the Capital Market, we believe that the credit market conditions are 
less important for the VC segment and, therefore, we discard that construct. Unfortunately, the 
available data does not allow the separation of lagged Venture Capital and lagged Private 
Equity activities, since for many of our sample countries no such differentiation was made in 
the past. Hence, we retain our measure for lagged Venture Capital and Private Equity activity 
likewise for both indexes. 
Regarding Taxation we refer to Bruce (2000 and 2002), Cullen and Gordon (2002), Bruce and 
Gurley (2005), and Djankov et al. (2008) who discuss the impact of corporate tax rates and the 
differential to the income tax rate on entrepreneurial activity and the entry of businesses. Since 
our key driver Taxation directly seizes their arguments, we discard the construct from the PE 
index. Additionally, we should note that there is another effect that we have ignored so far, 
which impacts contrarily and hence, suggests to discard Taxation from the PE index: Low tax 
rates decrease the value of tax shields in debt financed transactions, and hence their rationale. 
With respect to the Human and Social Environment, the level of education, and crime should 
influence entrepreneurial culture more strongly. Contrarily, labor regulations, and hiring and 
firing difficulties hurt more-established corporations than start-ups, where the entrepreneurial 
spirit of the employees is mandatory anyway. Finally, R&D spending, and innovativeness 
should be less important for the later stage segment, while we assume that privatization 
activities generate deal flow for PE funds. Additionally, there should be a relationship of the 
deal flow in the PE market segment and the total number of corporations in an economy, but 
not with the number of new start-ups. Finally, the burden to start a business is not relevant for 
already existing corporations. Consequently, we discard these data series (respectively 
constructs) from either data sample for the sub-indexes. 
In Table 7, we present the chosen data series for the separate VC and PE indexes. The 
calculations directly follow our base case procedure and are described in the Appendix. 
While the selection of data series for our separate VC and PE indexes is economically 
motivated, we propose a pure technical approach for a “tight VC and PE index”. Therefore, we 
apply a simple heuristic to improve the statistical quality of our data aggregation, and discard 
data series or constructs that share little common variance with the other data. We search the 
data series and constructs that maximize Cronbach’s Alphas and MSA values. This leads to a 
redefinition of the key drivers and all the underlying items. We start on the level of the 
individual data series and analyze the impact of regrouping or discarding them. We strictly 
drop items with MSA values below 0.5 or with negative marginal contributions to the 
Cronbach’s Alpha from our dataset. Since this heuristic is based on repeated trials, we only 
present the final index composition in the Appendix. In Table 7, we show the 17 remaining 
data series and the index structure together with the chosen data series and constructs for the 
separate VC and PE indexes.  
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Table 7 
Composition of the robustness checks 







1. Economic Activity  X X X 
1.1. Gross Domestic Product  X  X   
1.1.1. Total GDP [€/capita] X  X  X 
1.1.2. Total GDP y-o-y Growth [%]  X  X   
1.2. General Price Level [Index=1995]  X  X  X 
1.3. Working Force (Unemployment Rate) [%]  X  X  X 
1.4. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows [% of GDP]  X  X   
2. Capital Market  X X X 
2.1. IPO [IPO Volume in % of GDP]  X  X   
2.2. Stock Market  X X X 
2.2.1. Stock Market Capitalization [% of GDP]  X  X  X 
2.2.2. Stock Market Total Value Traded / GDP [% of GDP]  X  X  X 
2.3. M&A Market [sales % of GDP]  X  X   
2.4. Debt & Credit Market   X  
2.4.1. Central Bank Discount Rate [%]    X   
2.4.2. Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions [% of GDP]    X  X 
2.4.3. Number of Banks [per Capita]    X   
2.5. VC/PE Activity [Funds Invested in % of GDP]  X  X   
3. Taxation   X    
3.1. Highest Marginal Corporate Tax Rate (%)  X     
3.2. Difference Between Income and Corporate Tax Rate [%]  X     
4. Investor Protection and Corporate Governance  X X X 
4.1. Extent of Disclosure Index  X  X  X 
4.2. Extent of Director Liability Index  X  X  X 
4.3. Ease of Shareholder Suits Index  X  X  X 
5. Human & Social Environment  X X   
5.1. Education  X    
5.1.1. Government Expenditure on Education [% of GDP]  X     
5.1.2. Amount Employees as Researchers in the University Sector [per capita]  X     
5.1.3. Amount University Students [per capita]  X     
5.1.4. Amount University Establishments [per capita]  X     
5.2. Labor Regulations   X  
5.2.1. Rigidity of Employment    X   
5.2.1.1. Difficulty of Hiring Index    X   
5.2.1.2. Rigidity of Hours Index    X   
5.2.1.3. Difficulty of Firing Index    X   
5.2.2. Hiring Cost [% of salary]    X   
5.2.3. Firing Costs [weeks of wages]    X   
5.3. Bribing & Corruption Index  X  X   
5.4. Crime  X    
5.4.1. Juvenile Offenders [per capita]  X     
5.4.2. Offences [per 100,000 habitants]  X     
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities  X X X 
6.1. General Innovativeness Index  X    X 
6.2. R&D Expenditure  X  X 
6.2.1. Public R&D Expenditures [% of GDP]  X    X 
6.2.2. Business R&D Expenditures [% of GDP]  X    X 
6.3. Enterprise Restructuring    X   
6.3.1. Small-Scale Privatization Index    X   
6.3.2. Large-Scale Privatization Index    X   
6.3.3. Governance and Enterprise Restructuring Index    X   
6.4. Enterprise Stock Activity  X  X   
6.4.1. Number of Enterprises [per capita]    X   
6.4.2. Enterprise Foundation Rate [%]  X     
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business  X    X 
6.5.1. Procedures [numbers]  X    X 
6.5.2. Time [days]  X  X 
6.5.3. Cost of Business Start-Up Procedures [% GNI per capita]  X    X 
6.5.4. Min. Capital [% GNI per capita]   X    X 
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Table 7 reveals that, compared to our base case and the separate VC and PE indexes, the tight 
index depends more strongly on the economic power of the countries, on the state of their debt 
and public equity markets, on investors’ protection, on innovativeness, and on the burden for 
starting businesses. 
Including our robustness checks and the sensitivity analyses, we have a lot of variation in our 
index definitions and aggregation methods. We compare the country scores with respect to the 
different versions and present the ranking results in Figure 4. As our base case calculation and 
the four sensitivity analyses are based on the same data and index structure, we mark the span 
of their ranks as a vertical line. Hence, this line shows the variability of a country’s ranking 
across the different calculation methods. The small horizontal bar is the average of these five 
(not necessarily different) ranks. The order of the countries from left to right is according to 
these average positions and, therefore, not equal to the order as in Figure 1. For the three 
robustness checks, we break with the data structure and, hence, do not include the ranks of the 
robustness checks in the vertical bar as an indicator for deviation, but mark them separately. 
Additionally, it is of particular interest to demarcate the VC and PE indexes to address strengths 
and weaknesses of our sample countries with respect to both market segments separately. The 
triangle indicates the rank for the VC index, while the dot represents the PE rank. The cross 
designates the tight index rank. 
Figure 4 















It is evident from the sensitivity analyses that the dispersion of ranks is not very large among 
the different calculation procedures. Additionally, the deviations of the separate VC and PE 
index ranks, as well as of the tight index are not very large for most of the countries, except for 
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rank from the average rank (of the sensitivity analyses) is caused by changes in weight, 
respectively by the deletion of data series where the countries have competitive 
advantages/disadvantages. Spain and Italy advance many positions if we focus on the 
attractiveness of their PE markets only, which is mainly due to the deletion of Taxation in that 
index. Ireland and Hungary lose some ranking positions for the same reason. Switzerland 
benefits because some of its deficits regarding Human and Social Environment are discarded. 
However, if we focus on the VC index, their comparative positions remain. This confirms our 
base case calculation, which considers both segments, and uses more data series. 
From Figure 4, we can also identify five tier groups of attractiveness as marked by the dashed 
lines. Within those tier groups, the ranks vary with respect to the different sensitivity analyses 
and index versions, but there is hardly any transition across the tier groups. 
5.4. Explanatory Power of the Results 
Intuitively, the VC/PE fundraising activity should indicate the attractiveness of a particular 
country to foreign investors. Hence, there should be a strong correlation between our VC/PE 
attractiveness scores and the actual fundraising activities in the various countries. We measure 
the expected VC/PE activity as ratios between raised funds and GDP. For a part of our sample, 
the recent European Union accession countries, the fund raising activity fluctuated very 
strongly in the past from zero to peak levels in some years. For this reason, we use averages 
over five years to smooth the fluctuations using data from the EVCA (2003, 2004, 2005, and 
2006) yearbooks. We determine the Pearson Correlation of the VC and PE fundraising activity 
with the index-scores of our base case, all the sensitivity calculations, and the tight index 
version. Unfortunately, we cannot compare our two VC and PE indexes with the actual separate 
VC and PE fundraising activities. For the same accession countries, EVCA made no sufficient 
distinction of the two market segments in the past. Hence, there is no disaggregated data on the 
two distinct segments available and, therefore, no consistent analyses over all the countries 
possible. Table 8 summarizes the correlation analyses. 
Table 8 
Tracking power of the sensitivity analyses and the tight index 
Index Calculation Method 
Correlation with VC/PE 
activity, (two-tailed 
significance level) 
Base Case: Rescaling, factor analysis, geometric aggregation  0.599, (0.002) 
Rescaling, equal weights, geometric aggregation  0.580, (0.002) 
Rescaling, factor analysis, linear aggregation  0.567, (0.003) 
Rescaling, equal weights, linear aggregation  0.551, (0.004) 
Z-scores, equal weights, linear aggregation  0.529, (0.007) 
Tight Index: Rescaling, factor analysis, geometric aggregation  0.550, (0.004) 
 
The correlation analyses reveal (ρ = 0.599) that our base case calculation method is the most 
adequate to measure the attractiveness of a country for Venture Capital and Private Equity 
investors. However, the proposed factor analyses are extensive. Evading the effort to perform these 
analyses and weighing all index items and constructs equally yields to a small decrease of the 
tracking power (ρ = 0.580). If we keep our base case, but aggregate all the constructs linearly 
(instead of geometrically), we further decrease the index’s tracking power (ρ = 0.567). Avoiding 
factor analyses in that case continues deteriorating the result (ρ = 0.551). We receive the largest loss  
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in quality if we use z-scores to standardize the variables (ρ = 0.529) instead of rescaling them. 
Finally, discarding data series from our proposed selection, and optimizing the statistical quality of 
the data aggregation, as in our tight index version, indeed leads to a lean and consistent index, but 
also to less satisfying results (ρ = 0.550). This means that the advantage of handling less data and 
performing fewer calculations goes along with a loss of the explanatory power. 
Figure 5 















In Figure 5, we present the tracking power of our base case index. The ordinate captures the 
expected VC and PE activity in the particular countries, measured by the average of the ratios of 
funds being raised and GDP for the years 2001 to 2005. The data source is the EVCA (2003, 2004, 
2005, and 2006) yearbooks. The abscissa reflects the countries’ scores according to our base case 
Venture Capital and Private Equity Attractiveness Index. Additionally, we also consider the 
economic prosperity of the countries [GDP/capita] by the size of the bubbles to provide a 
benchmark for comparison.
3 Figure 5 expresses the dominating role of the United Kingdom 
regarding the VC/PE activity in Europe. We should note however, that the data on raised funds is 
collected according to the “office approach”. That means that the headquarters of the fund raising 
GPs determine the country statistics. It is not clear, where the money will finally be invested. For 
example, a large portion of the capital allocated in the United Kingdom serves other European 
countries. On one hand, this represents investors’ confidence in the quality of the United Kingdom 
finance professional community. On the other hand, this highlights that the raised funds are a 
biased indicator for expected VC/PE activity in particular country. 
                                              
3 Note: Bulgaria’s GDP/capita ratio is very small and its expected VC/PE activity is close to zero. Hence, Bulgaria’s 
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6. Conclusions and Outlook 
We present a composite index to measure the attractiveness of 25 European countries for 
Venture Capital and Private Equity investors. Therefore, we review the literature on VC/PE 
activity determinants and identify six key drivers that affect a country’s attractiveness: 
Economic Activity, Capital Markets, Taxation, Investor Protection & Corporate Governance, 
Human & Social Environment, and Entrepreneurial Opportunities. We propose 42 data series to 
proxy these key drivers, and different methods for calculating the index, namely for 
normalization, weighting, and aggregation. We run a base case calculation and find the United 
Kingdom to be the most attractive European country for VC/PE investors, followed by Ireland, 
Denmark, Sweden, and Norway. The largest European economy, Germany, ranks slightly above 
the European Union average. Other large European economies, such as France, Italy and Spain 
show little attractiveness. The ranking concludes with Bulgaria, Greece, Slovakia, and Romania. 
The low attractiveness scores of Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Romania are understandable, as they 
are recent entrants into the European Union and still in transition from a former centrally 
planned economy. However, for Greece the result is rather disappointing. 
In additional robustness checks, we distinguish the differences of the two market segments 
Venture Capital and Private Equity, and calculate two separate indexes. Further, we present a 
“tight index” where we discard data series with little or negative contribution to the series’ 
unidimensionality. This reduces the number of necessary data series to 17, and likewise 
addresses a potential over-determination of our base case index. We find that the advantage of 
less effort in collecting data and running the calculations goes along with less explanatory 
power of the index. We measure the explanatory power of the different index-versions by the 
correlation of the country scores with their actual VC and PE fundraising activity and receive 
the highest correlation for our proposed base case index. The separate VC and PE indexes lead 
to similar country rankings as our base case. However, some countries slightly change their 
rank if we focus on their attractiveness for either Venture Capital or Private Equity investments. 
Over all of our index versions and robustness checks, we find five tier groups of attractiveness 
rankings for the European countries. This signals the robustness of our calculations: the results 
are economically driven by interaction of several criteria, and not by the statistical approach or 
by individual data series. 
Lack of space prevents us from commenting on all the individual countries. However, we find a 
general pattern if we compare the characteristics. There is dispersion in all the six key drivers 
across Europe. Some countries attract investors with low corporate taxes. The Nordic countries 
are especially strong in Entrepreneurial Opportunities. There is some dispersion in Economic 
Activity, and in the Human & Social Environment. However, Investor Protection & Corporate 
Governance, and Capital Markets make the difference. The United Kingdom clearly dominates 
all the other countries regarding these criteria while their taxation score is below the European 
average, and while the other criteria are on a par. Glaeser et al. (2001), and Djankov et al. (2003 
and 2005) discuss the impact of a common-law system and La Porta et al. (1997 and 1998) 
confirm that the legal environment strongly determines the size and liquidity of a country’s 
capital market. Roe (2006) expands this line of research and comments on the historical 
development of corporate governance rules for major economies. He points to the importance 
of shareholder protection for the establishment of a vibrant capital market, and compliments 
the United Kingdom’s example. Black and Gilson (1998) emphasize the role of the professional 
infrastructure that accompanies the stock market-centered capital markets. From their studies, 
we can conclude that good investor protection leads to a vivid capital market, and this likewise  
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evolves the required professional community to secure deal flow and exit opportunities for VC 
and PE funds. This ultimately determines a country’s attractiveness for institutional investments 
in the VC/PE asset class. 
However, Black and Gilson (1998) name it a “chicken and egg problem”: a VC/PE market 
requires a stock market but a stock market requires entrepreneurs and exit transactions, which 
in turn, require a VC/PE market. Instead of creating multiple new institutions, they recommend 
piggybacking on the institutional setting of another country. If this is successful, it will bring a 
potential for the development of local institutions. For example, foreign VC/PE funds might 
find it profitable to hire and train locals to help them find investment opportunities. Once 
trained, some of them will found their own companies locally, and compete with their former 
employers. 
While their arguments are very rich, the discussion reflects the capital supply side only. We 
should also take into account that, as revealed in our analyses, some European countries lack 
several important attractiveness criteria. Without sufficient entrepreneurial culture and 
entrepreneurial opportunities, with rigid labor markets, and bribery and corruption, there will 
be no demand for Venture Capital and Private Equity. If there is no demand, there is also no 
need to piggyback on another country’s institutions. 
The availability of the necessary data series limits the scope of our index. The full data set with 
the required quality is not available to any useful extent for other regions of the world (besides 
North America). However, the research project should be extended to cover the whole world. A 
fruitful approach is to search for new data series that cover all relevant countries and to 
calculate an index based on the proposed method for comparison between continents and, 
especially, for emerging markets. This should shed more light on the worldwide competition of 
economic regions. 
Unfortunately, our economic approach cannot cover special situations or special opportunities 
for VC/PE investments in particular countries. This is notably the case for tax considerations. It 
is impossible to cover and compare individual countries’ tax regimes on a general and 
transparent level, especially including taxes on dividends, and capital gains taxes, which are of 
particular importance for the asset class in question. Similarly, this is valid for different public 
subsidy policies to attract institutional capital. Moreover, our approach relies on last available 
and historic (averaged) data, and cannot consider the latest development of individual items. 
Nevertheless, we attempt to contribute to the transparency of the VC/PE asset allocation 
process, and to discover strengths and weaknesses of the European economies to spur their 
competitiveness, innovation, entrepreneurship, employment, and growth.  
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Appendix A 
Motivation for the Data Selection 
The presented selection of raw data and ready-made indexes in Table 1 deserves several comments. 
Unfortunately, due to the poor supply for adequate data, we choose individual data series in reverse 
order of the criteria. In the first stage, the choice is driven by its availability for the sample countries, 
and in the second stage by its character. Data series like GDP/capita or average GDP growth are 
commonly available and need not be explained. However, a construct like Crime is less intuitive. We 
emphasize that the basic idea of the index is that the chosen data series do not directly express the 
attractiveness of an individual country for VC and PE investors, but all of the data related together 
contribute to that latent information. The rationale for the definition of a construct like Crime is the 
following: as also discussed by Djankov et al. (2002) the crime rate in a particular country affects its 
human and social environment, and an investor should prefer countries with lower crime rates. Hence, 
crime is a latent driver for institutional investors’ activities. Unfortunately, an objective and reliable 
measure for crime does not exist on a pan-European scale. There only exist two data series on juvenile 
offenders and offences per capita for our sample countries. It sounds odd, to relate juvenile offences 
and institutional investments. However, this is exactly the justification of the proposed index 
structure: we assume that the number of juvenile offenders and offences per capita contribute to the 
perception of crime in a society. The perception of crime is one criterion to describe the human and 
social environment, which is in turn, finally one parameter that institutional investors consider for 
their international asset allocation. This way, the number of juvenile offenders becomes a latent driver 
of the country’s attractiveness. With this presupposition, we describe in the following sections the 
choice of our data series for every key driver. 
A.1. Data for the Economic Activity Construct 
Our definition of the Economic Activity construct follows the findings of Gompers and Lerner (1998), 
Wilken (1979), and Romain and van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie (2004). They argue that the growth of 
national economies influences the foundation of new enterprises. Related to that, the pure size of an 
economy should also determine the VC/PE activity. First, one might expect a similar ratio of VC/PE 
activity to economy size for comparable countries. Hence, the ratio represents average VC/PE funding 
needs. Second, institutional investors might just not track countries of little economic size. Similar to 
these reasons, we add an indicator for inflation, for unemployment, and for foreign direct investments to 
the construct. With the indicator for inflation, we control for real growth. Unemployment represents 
another criterion for the prosperity of an economy. The net inflow of foreign direct investments mirrors 
the availability to attract international investments in general. We assume that this indicator first 
summarizes all the economic conditions to some extent and, second, strongly correlates with the 
attractiveness to receive VC/PE funding. 
Regarding the correlation of the chosen indicators, we would expect that GDP/capital correlates 
negatively with economic growth, as small economies have more potential to achieve large growth 
rates. Contrarily, we assume that large growth is related positively to higher inflation and a higher 
current unemployment rate. These issues highlight the problem of selecting adequate criteria and 
finally determining their weight in the overall index. As we present in the analytical section of the 
paper, it is more promising for the determination of the index weights if we focus on positively 
correlated variables only. However, we argue by the provided economic reasoning that it is neither 
desirable nor adequate to include only positively correlated variables in this and the following 
constructs. Likewise, this is proven with our tight index calculation where we discard (among others) 
the negatively correlating determinant GDP growth. As a result, the tight index has inferior tracking 
power of the VC/PE fundraising activity. 
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A.2. Data for the Capital Market Construct 
For the Capital Market Construct, we differentiate the deal flow and exit market conditions, the debt 
market, and a variable to measure the lagged VC/PE activity itself. The IPO activity proxies the exit 
conditions in a particular country. Even if there exist opportunities to go public abroad, we expect a 
strong relationship between a national IPO volume and the VC/PE attractiveness as likewise documented 
by Jeng and Wells (2000), and Kaplan and Schoar (2005). Referring to Black and Gilson (1998), Gompers 
and Lerner (2000), and Schertler (2003), the stock market capitalization and the trading volume capture 
the size and liquidity of the public equity markets. This construct indicates the probability of finding 
preferable exit conditions and additionally, measure the degree of the finance and capital market culture 
and the finance professional environment in a country. Similar, this is valid for the M&A market volume, 
that indicates both deal flow (for the PE segment) and exit conditions. 
We measure the state of the debt market conditions by three criteria: the central bank discount rate, 
by private credit activity, and by the number of banks per capita. As pointed out by Green (1998) 
and Hellmann (2004), banks also play an important role for the VC segment. However, facing good 
debt financing opportunities is even more important for later stage transactions. For this construct, 
it would be desirable to use proxies that replicate better and more directly the debt financing 
conditions for VC/PE transactions. For example, it would be more promising to use the price for debt 
in Leveraged Buyout transactions directly, or to focus on the number of investment banks only. 
However, this data simply does not exist on the pan-European scale. Instead, we capture competition 
among banks by their number per capita, and by the private loan activity. We assume that if the 
competition among banks is high, it is easier to receive debt financing, also for Leveraged Buyouts 
and VC transactions. The central bank discount rate indicates the price of risk-free lending. We use 
it as an indicator for the cost of debt and, hence, the cost of capital for transaction financing. We 
emphasize that the rate is the same for all countries in the Euro-zone, but there is some variation 
among the countries outside the zone. 
The last criterion that we use to build the capital market construct is the VC/PE activity itself. We 
refer to Sapienza et al. (1996), and Balboa and Martí (2003) and include a lagged variable for VC/PE 
investments over a three year average. It can be argued that including this parameter immediately 
increases the tracking power of the attractiveness index. However, we refer to the presented 
calculation procedures and claim that, finally, the weight of this criterion in the overall index is 
(depending on the aggregation method) 4% maximum. Hence, this does not substantially affect the 
results. 
A.3. Data for the Taxation Construct 
It would be desirable to include a country-indicator on the taxation of capital gains, as pointed out by 
Gompers and Lerner (1998) or directly on investors’ tax burdens in general. Once more, as no such 
comprehensible indicators exist for the different tax regimes on the European scale, we refer to Bruce 
(2000 and 2002), Cullen and Gordon (2002), and Djankov et al. (2008), and indirectly measure the tax 
incentives for corporate investment activity and entrepreneurship. The higher the marginal tax rate, 
the lower the incentive. Additionally, we include the difference between personal and corporate taxes 
as suggested by Bruce and Gurley (2005) in the construct. The latter criterion is probably more 
important for the early stage market segment, as it measures a direct tendency towards starting a 
business. We interpret our construct in that way: more corporate investment activity and more 
entrepreneurial activity lead to better deal flow and exit conditions, and hence, to an increasing 
attractiveness. However, we should note, that there is also a reverse effect of the tax rate on debt 
financed transactions. The lower the corporate tax rate, the smaller the advantage from debt financing. 
Since we cannot control for this issue we discard the Taxation construct when we calculate the 
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A.4. Data for the Investor Protection & Corporate Governance Construct 
To measure the level of investor protection and corporate governance we refer to three indicators 
provided by World Bank and directly make use of the results of Djankov et al. (2005). The construct 
measures the strength of minority shareholder protection against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for 
personal gain. The indicators distinguish transparency of related-party transactions (this is the extent of 
disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (the extent of director liability index), and shareholders’ ability 
to sue officers and directors for misconduct (the ease of shareholder suits index). 
A.5. Data for the Human & Social Environment Construct 
It is the most difficult task to measure the human and social environment, because it lacks quantitative 
indicators. The choice of the data series for this construct is more constrained by the availability of 
adequate information. Since it is impossible to capture the entrepreneurial spirit and entrepreneurial 
culture in particular economies by a comprehensible indicator as would be suggested by Lee and Peterson 
(2000), and Baughn and Neupert (2003), we focus on Megginson (2004) and include a measure of 
intellectual potential and output of talented people based on education. Hence, education is the first sub-
construct to proxy the human and social environment. We are aware of the special difficulty of an 
international comparison of educational levels. However, it is intuitive that the potential output of 
talented entrepreneurs and managers relates to the expenditure on education, and the number of 
researchers and university students. 
We also include a measure for labor market regulations in this construct. This sub-construct is based on 
the findings of Lazear (1990), Blanchard (1997), and Black and Gilson (1998). The available data sets 
describe the labor market rigidity and are provided by World Bank. Further, we include bribery and 
corruption and crime in this construct. Djankov et al. (2002) describe the negative consequences 
associated with corruption and the unofficial economy. Unfortunately, measures for the unofficial 
economy are by definition not available. The only remaining possibility is to proxy them by the numbers 
of (registered) offences and juvenile offenders. 
A.6. Data for the Entrepreneurial Opportunities Construct 
The construct for entrepreneurial opportunities considers both the Venture Capital and the Private Equity 
segment. We capture the opportunities for start-up creations, as well as the deal flow perspective from 
enterprise restructurings and from the pure quantity of corporations. However, in our robustness check 
we split this construct and analyze the consequences for the index rankings when we focus on only the 
Early Stage or the Later Stage segment. Following Kortum and Lerner (2000), and Schertler (2003), we 
focus on an index that measures the general innovativeness of countries; in this instance the number of 
patents produced. We also include public and corporate spending for R&D, as suggested by Gompers and 
Lerner (1998). More important for the Later Stage segment, we consider measures for expected 
restructuring and privatization activities provided by EBRD. Here, we assume that lower privatization and 
restructuring scores enable transaction opportunities for Later Stage funds. This is similarly valid for the 
inclusion of the enterprise stock and the enterprise foundation rate. The first criterion should correlate 
with the deal flow for the Later Stage, and the second one with the Early Stage market segment. 
Finally, we refer to Djankov et al. (2002) and Baughn and Neupert (2003) and use data series from World 
Bank to capture administrative burdens for starting businesses. Once more, the potential deal flow, 
especially in the VC segment, should correlate with the difficulty of becoming an entrepreneur.  
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Appendix B 
Factor Analyses for the Construction of the Key Drivers 
Analysis for Economic Activity 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.549 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  22.200 
  df  6 
  Sig.  0.001 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  1.892  47.289  47.289  1.715  42.887  42.887 
2.  1.152  28.810  76.099  1.328  33.212  76.099 
3.  0.697  17.414  93.513          
4.  0.259  6.487  100.000          
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
  
1  2 
1.1. Gross Domestic Product  0.881  0.216 
1.2. General Price Level  -0.141  0.878 
1.3. Working Force  0.556  0.693 
1.4. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows [% of GDP]  0.781  -0.175 
 
Determination of Weights 
Economic Activity  Component loadings  Component weights 
   1 2  1  2 
Overall 
weights 
1.1. Gross Domestic Product  0.881  0.216  0.453  0.035  0.270 
1.2. General Price Level  -0.141  0.878  0.012  0.580  0.260 
1.3. Working Force  0.556  0.693  0.180  0.362  0.259 
1.4. Foreign Direct Investment, Net Inflows [% of GDP]  0.781  -0.175  0.355  0.023  0.210 
Explained Variance  1.715 1.328 1  1  1 
Explained/Total Variance  0.564 0.436  Sum  Sum 
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Analysis for Capital Market 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.603 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  51.054 
   df  10 
   Sig.  0.000 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.606  52.117  52.117  2.011  40.226  40.226 
2.  1.153  23.064  75.181  1.748  34.955  75.181 
3.  0.740  14.805  89.986          
4.  0.357  7.150  97.136          
5.  0.143  2.864  100.000          
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
   1  2 
2.1. IPO  0.948  -0.009 
2.2. Stock Market  0.522  0.607 
2.3. M&A Market  0.068  0.733 
2.4. Debt & Credit Market  0.108  0.871 
2.5. VC/PE Activity  0.908  0.289 
 
Determination of Weights 
Capital Market  Component loadings  Component weights 
   1 2  1  2 
Overall 
weights 
2.1. IPO  0.948  -0.009  0.447  0.000  0.239 
2.2. Stock Market  0.522  0.607  0.135  0.211  0.170 
2.3. M&A Market  0.068  0.733  0.002  0.308  0.144 
2.4. Debt & Credit Market  0.108  0.871  0.006  0.434  0.205 
2.5. VC/PE Activity  0.908  0.289  0.410  0.048  0.241 
Explained Variance  2.011 1.748 1  1  1 
Explained/Total Variance  0.535 0.465  Sum  Sum 
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Analysis for Human and Social Environment 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.604 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  24.907 
   df  6 
   Sig.  0.000 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component  
Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.045  51.131  51.131  2.045  51.128  51.128 
2.  1.143  28.586  79.718  1.144  28.590  79.718 
3.  0.525  13.118  92.835          
4.  0.287  7.165  100.000          
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
 
1  2 
5.1. Education  0.145  0.923 
5.2. Labor Regulations  0.666  -0.517 
5.3. Bribing & Corruption Index  0.893  0.117 
5.4. Crime  -0.885  -0.107 
 
Determination of Weights 
Human and Social Environment  Component loadings  Component weights 
   1 2  1  2 
Overall 
weights 
5.1. Education  0.145 0.923  0.010  0.745  0.274 
5.2. Labor Regulations  0.666 -0.517  0.217  0.233  0.223 
5.3. Bribing & Corruption Index  0.893 0.117  0.390  0.012  0.255 
5.4. Crime  -0.885 -0.107  0.383  0.010  0.249 
Explained Variance  2.045 1.144 1  1  1 
Explained/Total Variance  0.641 0.359  Sum  Sum 
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Analysis for Entrepreneurial Opportunities 
KMO and Bartlett's Test 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy  0.624 
Bartlett's Test of Sphericity  Approx. Chi-Square  80.855 
   df  10 
   Sig.  0.000 
 
Total Variance Explained 
Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component  
Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.988  59.754  59.754  2.421  48.412  48.412 
2.  1.100  22.009  81.763  1.668  33.351  81.763 
3.  0.486  9.727  91.490          
4.  0.372  7.431  98.921          
5.  0.054  1.079  100.000          
 
Rotated Component Matrix 
Component 
 
1  2 
6.1. General Innovativeness Index  0.854  0.447 
6.2. R&D Expenditure  0.855  0.355 
6.3. Enterprise Restructuring  0.875  -0.132 
6.4. Enterprise Stock Activity  0.019  0.907 
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business  0.441  0.709 
 
Determination of Weights 
Entrepreneurial Opportunities  Component loadings  Component weights 
   1 2  1  2 
Overall 
weights 
6.1. General Innovativeness Index  0.854 0.447  0.301  0.120  0.227 
6.2. R&D Expenditure  0.855 0.355  0.302  0.076  0.210 
6.3. Enterprise Restructuring  0.875 -0.132  0.316  0.010  0.191 
6.4. Enterprise Stock Activity  0.019 0.907  0.000  0.493  0.201 
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business  0.441 0.709  0.080  0.301  0.170 
Explained Variance  2.421 1.668 1  1  1 
Explained/Total Variance  0.592 0.408  Sum  Sum 
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Appendix C 
Composition of the Tight Index 
Economic Activity – Tight Index 
For the Economic Activity construct, we adhere to GDP/Capita and our measures for inflation 
and unemployment only, and discard GDP-growth, and Foreign Direct Investments. This way, 
we receive a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.764, a MSA value of 0.576 and a Bartlett’s Test significant 
at the 0.000 level. We highlight that discarding the two data series with little unidimensionality 
increases Cronbach’s Alpha by 0.221 points, compared to our base case analysis. In the factor 
analysis, we extract one single factor that explains 68.2% of the construct variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component   Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.045  68.172  68.172 
2.  0.699  23.301  91.474 
3.  0.256  8.526  100.000 
 




1.1.1. Total GDP [€/capita]  0.917 0.411 
1.2. General Price Level  0.711 0.247 
1.3. Working Force  0.836 0.342 
 
Capital Market – Tight Index 
The capital market construct is statistically optimized using the measures for public market 
liquidity (Stock Market Capitalization/GDP, and Stock Market Total Value Traded/GDP), and 
private debt volume (Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial 
Institutions/GDP). The Cronbach Alpha yields the very high score of 0.880, the MSA value 
becomes 0.709 and Bartlett’s test of Sphericity is significant at a 0.000 level. 
We detect one single factor that explains 81.79% of the total-construct variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.454  81.793  81.793 
2.  0.387  12.895  94.687 
3.  0.159  5.313  100.000 
 




2.2.1. Stock Market Capitalization  0,935 0,357 
2.2.2. Stock Market Total Value Traded  0,921 0,346 
2.4.2. Private Credit by Deposit Money Banks and Other Financial Institutions  0,854 0,297  
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Human & Social Environment – Tight Index 
Since we respectively use two and three individual data series to proxy the key drivers Taxation 
and Investors Protection and Corporate Governance we keep them equally weighted as in our 
base case index. For Human & Social Environment we adhere to the data series that describe 
the labor market rigidity. This yields a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.735 and a MSA value of 0.738. 
Bartlett’s Test for Sphericity is at the 0.000 level significant. We extract one factor that explains 
57.15% of the construct variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.286  57.154  57.154 
2.  0.733  18.319  75.473 
3.  0.509  12.735  88.207 
4.  0.472  11.793  100.000 
 





5.2.1.1. Difficulty of Hiring  0.760 0.253 
5.2.1.2. Rigidity of Hours  0.787 0.271 
5.2.1.3. Difficulty of Firing  0.742 0.240 
5.2.3. Firing Costs  0.734 0.236 
 
Entrepreneurial Opportunities – Tight Index 
We reduce the Entrepreneurial Opportunities construct to three data series: the General 
Innovativeness Index, the measure for R&D expenditures and the measure for the burden of 
starting a business. The constructs Cronbach’s Alpha is 0.853, the MSA value is 0.615 and 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity becomes significant at 0.000. We extract one factor that explains 
77.69% of the construct’s variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.331  77.690  77.690 
2.  0.599  19.958  97.648 
3.  0.071  2.352  100.000 
 




6.1. General Innovativeness Index  0.953 0.390 
6.2. R&D Expenditure  0.939 0.378 
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business  0.736 0.232 
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Aggregation to the Overall Tight Index 
In the final step, we aggregate the overall tight index from the six constructs using the same 
heuristic as described in the body of the paper to increase the statistical quality of the results. 
We receive a Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.776 when we discard the Taxation and the Human and 
Social Environment construct from the selection of items. We should note that this is a very 
little increase of the overall Cronbach’s Alpha of 0.007 points, only, compared to our base case. 
As a result, the tight index calculation is based on four key drivers only. The MSA value is 
0.705, and hence, 0.076 points above the base case and Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is 
significant at 0.000. The factor analysis yields two factors that explain 86.62% of the total 
index variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.447  61.182  61.182 
2.  1.018  25.440  86.622 
3.  0.286  7.160  93.782 
4.  0.249  6.218  100.000 
 
The factor rotation provides a similar interesting interpretation as for our base case index. The 
optimally calculated constructs Economic Activity, the Capital Market, and the Entrepreneurial 
Opportunities have high loadings on the first factor, while Investor Protection & Corporate 
Governance has a high loading on the second factor. Hence, the tight index reveals the same 
character. It depends on the socio-economic environment and on the investor protection and 









Components  1 2 1  2   
1. Economic Activity - Tight  0.891  0.202  0.327  0.039  0.241 
2. Capital Market - Tight  0.906  -0.098  0.339  0.009  0.240 
4. Investor Protection & Corporate Governance  0.044  0.993  0.001  0.950  0.285 
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities - Tight  0.899  0.045  0.333  0.002  0.234 
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Appendix D 
Calculation of the VC Index 
In the VC Index, the key drivers Economic Activity, Taxation, and Investor Protection & Corporate 
Governance remain unchanged. Hence, we only describe the reweighting procedure for the remaining 
constructs and for the overall VC Index aggregation in the following: 
Capital Market – VC Index 
With the remaining data series for the Capital Market construct, we receive a MSA value of 0.591 and 
Bartlett’s Test is significant at the 0.000 level. The factor analysis extracts one factor that contributes 
60.33% of the construct variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.413  60.331  60.331 
2.  0.865  21.632  81.963 
3.  0.585  14.615  96.577 
4.  0.137  3.423  100.000 
 




2.1. IPO  0.829 0.285 
2.2. Stock Market  0.756 0.237 
2.3. M&A Market  0.521 0.112 
2.5. VC/PE Activity  0.940 0.366 
 
Human & Social Environment – VC Index 
For the Human & Social Environment construct in the VC Index, we receive a MSA value of 0.517. 
Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is significant at the 0.000 level. 
The factor analysis extracts one factor that accounts for 59.13 % of the construct variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  1.774  59.129  59.129 
2.  0.953  31.763  90.892 
3.  0.273  9.108  100,000 
 




5.1. Education  0.320 0.058 
5.3. Bribing & Corruption Index  0.917 0.474 
5.4. Crime  -0.912 0.468  
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Entrepreneurial Opportunities – VC Index 
For the Entrepreneurial Opportunities construct, we calculate a MSA value of 0.659, and Bartlett’s Test is 
significant on the 0.000 level. The factor analysis yields one factor that explains 65.51% of the construct 
variance. 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.621  65.514  65.514 
2.  0.870  21.738  87.252 
3.  0.442  11.058  98.311 
4.  0.068  1.689  100.000 
 




6.1. General Innovativeness Index  0.958 0.350 
6.2. R&D Expenditure  0.934 0.333 
6.4.2. Enterprise Foundation Rate  -0.634 0.153 
6.5. Burden: Starting a Business  0.655 0.164 
 
Aggregation to the VC Index 
The aggregation of the redefined constructs to the VC Index yields a MSA value of 0.609 at a Bartlett’s 
Test of Sphericity significance level of 0.000. The factor analysis extracts two factors that account for 
66.42% of the variance in the data. 
Initial Eigenvalues  Rotation Sums of Squared Loadings 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative %  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.625  43.752  43.752  2.520  41.999  41.999 
2.  1.360  22.667  66.418  1.465  24.419  66.418 
3.  0.836  13.935  80.353          
4.  0.619  10.315  90.668          
5.  0.355  5.923  96.591          
6.  0.205  3.409  100.000          
 
Rotation leads to the following matrix of component loadings, and the corresponding weights of the 








Components  1 2 1  2   
1. Economic Activity – VC  0.826  0.126  0.271  0.011  0.175 
2. Capital Market – VC  0.734  0.001  0.292  0.001  0.185 
3.  Taxation  -0.309 0.755  0.038  0.389 0.167 
4. Investor Protection & Corporate Governance  0.202  0.715  0.016  0.349  0.139 
5. Human & Social Environment – VC  0.465  0.605  0.086  0.249  0.146 
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities - VC  0.866  0.028  0.298  0.001  0.188  
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Appendix E 
Calculation of the PE Index 
For the PE index, we need to recalculate the Human & Social Environment construct, and the 
Entrepreneurial Opportunities construct. The other key drivers remain unchanged, and are not 
considered in the PE index. For the Human & Social Environment key driver, there remain only 
two constructs to consider: 5.2 Labor Regulations, and 5.3 Bribery & Corruption Index. Hence, 
we apply equal weights to aggregate Human & Social Environment in the PE index. Analogue, 
this is the case for the Entrepreneurial Opportunities construct, where we equally weight 6.3 
Enterprise Restructuring and 6.4.1 Number of Enterprises. 
Aggregation to the overall index yields a MSA value of 0.756 at the 0.000 significance level of 
Bartlett’s test of Sphericity. 
The factor analysis extracts one factor, which contributes to 53.9% of the variance in the data. 
 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Component  Total  % of Variance  Cumulative % 
1.  2.695  53.900  53.900 
2.  0.980  19.592  73.492 
3.  0.708  14.151  87.643 
4.  0.398  7.955  95.598 
5.  0.220  4.402  100.000 
 




1. Economic Activity  0.836 0.276 
2. Capital Market  0.822 0.251 
4. Investor Protection & Corporate governance  0.436 0.071 
5. Human & Social Environment – PE  0.884 0.290 
6. Entrepreneurial Opportunities - PE  -0.550 0.112 
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Appendix F 
Raw Data Series and Ready-made Indexes - Explanations and Sources 




Total  GDP  capita  A region's gross domestic product, or GDP, is one of the 
several measures of the size of its economy. The GDP of a 
country is defined as the market value of all final goods and 
services produced within a country in a given period of time. 
It is also considered the sum of value added at every stage of 
production of all final goods and services produced within a 
country in a given period. The most common approach to 
measuring and understanding GDP is the expenditure 
method: GDP = consumption + investment + government 
spending + (exports − imports). 




Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics 
1.1.2. Total  GDP  y-o-y 
growth [%] 




Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics 
1.2. General  Price 
Level 
Nominal  GDP  Real  GDP  The ratio of nominal GDP to real GDP; a measure of the 
overall price level. Gives the average price of the final goods 
produced in the economy. 













1.4. Foreign  direct 
investment 
FDI, net inflow  GDP  The purchase of existing companies or the development of 
new companies by foreign investors. 
Global Market Information 
Database, UNCTAD 
2.1.  IPO Volume  IPO Volume  GDP  IPO as exit condition for Private Equity Investments.  Thomson Statistics 




GDP  Is a measurement of corporate size that refers to the current 
stock price times the number of outstanding shares. This 
measure differs from equity value to the extent that a firm 
has outstanding stock options or other securities convertible 
to common shares. The size and growth of a company’s 
market capitalization is often one of the critical 
measurements of a public company's success or failure. 
However, market capitalization may increase or decrease for 
reasons unrelated to performance such as acquisitions, 
divestitures and stock repurchases. 
Worldbank Data 






GDP  Trading volume of the Stock Market per year.  Worldbank Data 
2.3. M&A: sales/GDP    GDP    Global Market Information 
Database, UNCTAD 
2.4.1. Central  bank 
discount rate 
    Interest rate.  IMF, Global Financial 
Database 
2.4.2. Private Credit by 
Deposit Money 
Banks and Other 
Financial 
Institutions/GDP 
  GDP  Concentration of credits in the debt market.  Worldbank Data 




Capita  Concentration of banks leads to higher availability for credits.  EBRD, Transition report 
2005 
2.5. VC/PE 
Funds/GPD  [%] 
Funds raised 
per year 
GDP  Size of the Venture Capital market. The data is collected 
according to the office approach, which means according to 







    Incentive for starting a business.  Worldbank Data 
3.2. Income  - 
corporate tax 
rate [%] 





IESE Business School-University of Navarra - 45 





    Doing Business measures the strength of minority shareholder 
protections against directors’ misuse of corporate assets for 
personal gain. The indicators distinguish 3 dimensions of 
investor protection: transparency of transactions (extent of 
disclosure index), liability for self-dealing (extent of director 
liability index) and shareholders’ ability to sue officers and 
directors for misconduct (ease of shareholder suits index). The 
data come from a survey of corporate lawyers and is based 
on company laws, court rules of evidence and securities 
regulations. The strength of investor protection index is the 
average of the extent of disclosure index, the extent of 
director liability index and the ease of shareholder suits 
index. The index ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values 





Djankov et al. (2005). 
4.1. Extent  of 
disclosure index 
    The extent of disclosure index has 5 components: (i) what 
corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for the 
transaction; (ii) whether immediate disclosure of the 
transaction to the public, the shareholders or both is required; 
(iii) whether disclosure in the annual report is required; (iv) 
whether disclosure by the Buyer’s controlling shareholder and 
a member of Buyer’s board of directors to the board of 
directors is required; and (v) whether it is required that an 
external body, for example, an external auditor, review the 





Djankov et al. (2005). 
4.2. Extent  of 
director liability 
index 
    The extent of director liability index measures (i) a 
shareholder plaintiff’s ability to hold Buyer’s controlling 
shareholder and a member of Buyer’s board of directors liable 
for damage the Buyer-Seller transaction causes to the 
company; (ii) a shareholder plaintiff’s ability to hold the 
approving body; (iii) whether a court can avoid the 
transaction upon a successful claim by a shareholder 
plaintiff; (iv) whether Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a 
member of Buyer’s board of directors pays damages caused to 
the company upon a successful claim by the shareholder 
plaintiff; (vi) whether fines and imprisonment can be applied 
against the Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a member of 
Buyer’s board of directors; and (vii) shareholder plaintiffs’ 
ability to sue directly or derivatively for damage the 





Djankov et al. (2005). 
4.3. Ease  of 
shareholder suits 
index 
    The extent of disclosure index has 5 components: (i) what 
corporate body can provide legally sufficient approval for the 
transaction; (ii) whether immediate disclosure of the 
transaction to the public, the shareholders or both is required; 
(iii) whether disclosure in the annual report is required; (iv) 
whether disclosure by Buyer’s controlling shareholder and a 
member of Buyer’s board of directors is required; and (v) 
whether it is required that an external body, for example, an 













GDP  Approximation for educational level and hence human 
capital. 












capita  Approximation for educational level and hence human 
capital. 












capita  Approximation for educational level and hence human 
capital. 














capita  Approximation for educational level and hence human 
capital. 




Fund (IMF), International 
Financial Statistics 
5.2.1. Rigidity  of 
employment 
index 
    The rigidity of employment index is the average of three sub-
indices: a difficulty of hiring index, a rigidity of hours index 
and a difficulty of firing index. All the sub-indices have 
several components. All take values between 0 and 100, with 




ringWorkers/; Botero et al. 
(2004). 
5.2.1.1. Difficulty  of 
hiring index 
    The difficulty of hiring index measures has 3 components: (i) 
whether term contracts can be used only for temporary tasks; 
(ii) the maximum cumulative duration of term contracts; and 
(iii) the ratio of the minimum wage for a trainee or first-time 




ringWorkers/; Botero et al. 
(2004).  
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# Indicators Numerator  Denominator  Explanation  Source 
5.2.1.2.  Rigidity of hours 
index 
    The rigidity of hours index has 5 components: (i) whether 
night work is unrestricted; (ii) whether weekend work is 
unrestricted; (iii) whether the workweek can consist of 5.5 
days; (iv) whether the workweek can extend to 50 hours or 
more (including overtime) for 2 months a year; and (v) 




ringWorkers/;  Botero et al. 
(2004). 
5.2.1.3. Difficulty  of 
firing index 
    The difficulty of firing index has 8 components: (i) whether 
redundancy is disallowed as a basis for terminating workers; 
(ii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party (such 
as a government agency) to terminate 1 redundant worker; 
(iii) whether the employer needs to notify a third party to 
terminate a group of more than 20 redundant workers; (iv) 
whether the employer needs approval from a third party to 
terminate 1 redundant worker; (v) whether the employer 
needs approval from a third party to terminate a group of 
more than 20 redundant workers; (vi) whether the law 
requires the employer to consider reassignment or retraining 
options before redundancy termination; (vii) whether priority 
rules apply for redundancies; and (viii) whether priority rules 




ringWorkers/; Botero et al. 
(2004). 
5.2.2.  Hiring cost [% 
of salary] 
    The non-wage labor cost indicator measures all social 
security payments (including retirement fund; sickness, 
maternity and health insurance; workplace injury; family 
allowance; and other obligatory contributions) and payroll 
taxes associated with hiring an employee in fiscal year 2005. 




ringWorkers/; Botero et al. 
(2004). 
5.2.3. Firing  costs 
[weeks of wages] 
    The firing cost indicator measures the cost of advance notice 
requirements, severance payments and penalties due when 
terminating a redundant worker, expressed in weekly wages. 









    The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) is a composite index, 
using data compiled between 2003 and 2005. 16 surveys of 
businesspeople and assessments by country analysts from 10 
independent institutions enter the CPI. All sources employ a 
homogeneous definition of “extent of corruption”. The 
assessments are gathered from experienced respondents and 
enhance our understanding of real levels of corruption. Six 
dimensions of governance: (i) Voice and Accountability – 
measuring political, civil and human rights; (ii) Political 
Instability and Violence – measuring the likelihood of violent 
threats to, or changes in, government, including terrorism; 
(iii) Government Effectiveness – measuring the competence of 
bureaucracy and the quality of public service delivery; 
Regulatory Burden – measuring the incidence of market-
unfriendly policies; (iv) Rule of Law – measuring the quality 
of contract enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as 
the likelihood of crime and violence; (v) Control of 
Corruption – measuring the exercise of public power for 
private gain, including both petty and grand corruption and 
state capture. The index is coded on a ten point descending 




























    Innovation is one of the key-drivers of VC-activity. The index 
of the 2005 European Innovation Scoreboard deals with five 
categories that cover different key dimensions of innovation 
performance. Innovation drivers measure the structural 
conditions required for innovation potential, Knowledge 
creation measures the investments in R&D activities, 
Innovation & entrepreneurship measures the efforts towards 
innovation at the firm level, Application measures the 
performance expressed in terms of labor and business 
activities and their value added in innovative sectors, and 
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# Indicators Numerator  Denominator  Explanation  Source 
6.2.1. Public  R&D 
expenditures [% 
of GDP] 
Public R&D  GDP  Difference between GERD (Gross domestic expenditure on 
R&D) and BERD (Business enterprise expenditure on R&D). 
R&D expenditure represents one of the major drivers of 
economic growth in a knowledge-based economy. As such, 
trends in the R&D expenditure indicator provide key 
indications of the future competitiveness and wealth of the 
EU. Research and development spending is essential for 
making the transition to a knowledge-based economy as well 
as for improving production technologies and stimulating 
growth. Recognizing the benefits of R&D for growth and 
being aware of the rapidly widening gap between. 
InnovationScoreboard; 
http://trendchart.cordis.lu/ 
6.2.2. Business  R&D 
expenditures [% 
of GDP] 
Business R&D GDP  All  R&D expenditures in the business sector (BERD). 
The indicator captures the formal creation of new knowledge 
within companies. It is particularly important in the science-
based sector (pharmaceuticals, chemicals and some areas of 








    1= Little progress. 
2= Substantial share privatized. 
3= Comprehensive program under implementation. 
4= Complete privatization of small companies with tradable 
ownership rights. 
4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: no state ownership of small enterprises, 
effective tradability land. 





    1= Little private ownership. 
2= Comprehensive scheme almost ready for implementation, 
some sales completed. 
3= More than 25% of large-scale enterprise assets in private 
hands or in the process of being privatized (with the process 
having reached a stage at which the state has effectively 
ceded its ownership rights), but possibly with major 
unresolved issues regarding corporate governance. 
4= More than 50% of state-owned enterprise and farm assets 
in private ownership and significant progress with corporate 
governance of these enterprises. 
4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: more than 75% of enterprise assets in 
private ownership with effective corporate governance. 
EBRD, Transition report 
2005 




    1= Soft budget constraints (lax credit and subsidy policies 
weakening financial discipline at the enterprise level), few 
other reforms to promote corporate governance. 
2= Moderately tight credit and subsidy policy, but weak 
enforcement of bankruptcy legislation, little action taken to 
strengthen competition and corporate governance. 
3= Significant and sustained actions to harden budget 
constraints and to promote corporate governance effectively 
(for example, privatization combined with tight credit and 
subsidy policies and/or enforcement of bankruptcy 
legislation. 
4= Substantial improvement in corporate governance and 
significant new investment at the enterprise level, including 
minority holdings by financial investors. 
4+= Standards and performance typical of advanced 
industrial economies: effective corporate control exercised 
through domestic financial institutions and markets, fostering 
market-driven restructuring. 
EBRD, Transition report 
2005 













SME company growth rate.  Worldbank Data  
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# Indicators Numerator  Denominator  Explanation  Source 
6.5.1. Procedures 
[numbers] 
    A procedure is defined as any interaction of the company 
founder with external parties (government agencies, lawyers, 
auditors, notaries). Interactions between company founders or 
company officers and employees are not counted as 
procedures. Procedures that must be completed in the same 
building but in different offices are counted as separate 
procedures. The founders are assumed to complete all 
procedures themselves, without middlemen, facilitators, 
accountants or lawyers, unless the use of such a third party is 
mandated by law. 
Both pre- and post-incorporation procedures that are 
officially required for an entrepreneur to formally operate a 
business are recorded. Procedures that are not required to 
start and formally operate a business are ignored. For 
example, obtaining exclusive rights over the company name 
is not counted in a country where businesses may use a 
number as identification. Procedures required for official 
correspondence or transactions with public agencies are 
included. For example, if a company seal or stamp is required 
on official documents, such as tax declarations, obtaining it 
is counted. Similarly, if a company must open a bank account 
before registering for sales tax or value added tax, this 




Business/; Source: Djankov 
et al. (2002). 
 
6.5.2.  Time [days]      Time is recorded in calendar days. The measure captures the 
median duration that incorporation lawyers indicate is 
necessary to complete a procedure. It is assumed that the 
minimum time required for each procedure is 1 day. Although 
procedures may take place simultaneously, they cannot start 
on the same day. A procedure is considered completed once 
the company has received the final document, such as the 
company registration certificate or tax number. If a procedure 
can be accelerated for an additional cost, the fastest 
procedure is chosen. It is assumed that the entrepreneur does 
not waste time and commits to completing each remaining 
procedure without delay. The time that the entrepreneur 
spends on gathering information is ignored. It is assumed 
that the entrepreneur is aware of all entry regulations and 
their sequence from the beginning but has had no prior 




Business/; Source: Djankov 
et al. (2002). 
 
6.5.3. Cost  of  business 
start-up 
procedures [% 
GNI per capita] 
 
 GNI  per 
capita 
Cost is recorded as a percentage of the country’s income per 
capita. Only official costs are recorded. The company law, the 
commercial code and specific regulations and fee schedules 
are used as sources for calculating costs. In the absence of fee 
schedules, a government officer’s estimate is taken as an 
official source. In the absence of a government officer’s 
estimate, estimates of incorporation lawyers are used. If 
several incorporation lawyers provide different estimates, the 





Business/; Source: Djankov 
et al. (2002). 
 
6.5.4.  Min. capital [% 
of income per 
capita] 
 income  per 
capita 
The paid-in minimum capital requirement reflects the amount 
that the entrepreneur needs to deposit in a bank before 
registration starts and is recorded as a percentage of the 
country’s income per capita. The amount is typically specified 
in the commercial code or the company law. Many countries 
have a minimum capital requirement but allow businesses to 
pay only a part of it before registration, with the rest to be 




Business/; Source: Djankov 
et al. (2002). 
 
 